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WHY MULTILATERALISM MATTERS IN RESOLVING TRADE-
ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 
KEVIN C. KENNEDy' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the street scenes in Seattle in December 1999, and in Prague in September 
2000, made clear, some environmental groups are demanding an end to free trade 
and globalization.! They claim that trade liberalization and environmental 
degradation are linked in a direct cause-effect re1ationship.2 However, the wro 
Secretariat's Trade and Environment Report, published in October 1999, rejects 
sweeping generalizations on both sides of the issue. The report states that trade 
is neither good for the environment nor that it is bad for the environment.3 The 
wro press release arIOouncing the Secretariat's Report notes, "[t]he real world 
linkages are a little bit of both, or a shade of grey.'>4 
Environmentalists argue that with free trade comes economic growth, and 
with economic growth comes unacceptable levels of pollution, habitat 
destruction, and species extinction. Further, because market mechanisms do not 
always take full account of environmental costs, a legal climate that promotes 
unbridled free trade could contribute to the unrestricted, transboundary 
movement of hazardous products and waste. While some commentators view 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State Univen.-ity-Detroit College of Law. 
1. Angry and Eifodillt, THE EcONOMIST, Sept 23,2000, at 85. Not all environmental groups 
have demanded the end of free trade or the abolishment of the wrO. Chetyl Hogue, Environmental 
GrolljJr WantAdminirtralion to Pmrfor fufoI1JtJ at WTO Minirteria4 16 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 39, 
at 1606 (Oct 6, 1999)(noting that National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, Friends of the 
Earth, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Center for International Environmental Law support 
international trade); W~ Grtenr Sholildulit TmM, THE ECONOMIST, Oct 9, 1999, at 17; Elllbrncing 
Gmnery, THE ECONOMIST, Oct 9, 1999, at 89 (noting that the Sierra Club wants to reform the 
wro, not abolish it). 
2. See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, Exploring the Environmentnl Exctplionr in GAIT Article XX, 25 
J. WORLO'fRAOE 37,39-43 (1991);John Hunt,FmTmdm HeadintJOrClarhtvith Grtenr, FIN. TIMES, 
Sept 5, 1991, § I, at 6; Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environmtnt: SOllie NortlJ..Solith Comidtrt1lionr, 27 
CORNElL INT'LL.J. 591 (1994). For a summaty of arguments challenging this assumption, see 
Judith M. Dean, Me011lring the 1111pad ofFner T mM on the Environllltnt, INT'L ECON. REV. 3 (U.S. lnt'! 
Trade Comm'n Aug'/Sept 2000), available at http://www.usitc.gov/ier.htm. 
3. wrOSECRETARIATSPECIALSTUDIFS4: 'I'RADEANO ENVIRONMENT 26 (Oct 1999) 
[hereinafter wro SECRETARIAT). For a critique of the 1999 wro Report, see Steve Charnovitz, 
WorldTmdtondthe Environment:A Rtvit1lloftheNtIII WTO fuport, 12 GEO. INT'LENVTL.L. REV. 523 
(2000). 
4. wro, TraM Ubtmlizolion fuinjorctr theNttdfor EnvironmentoICooptrt1lion, Press Release 140 
(Oct 8, 1999). Set 0110 Elllbmci1lg Gree1lery, IIIjJm note 1, at 89-90. 
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this interrelationship with concern, others, primarily environmentalists, view the 
poor fit between trade and the environment with alarm.5 
Many environmentalists have been unrelenting in their wrO-bashing, casting 
the wro in the role of environmental villain. Why are the wro, and other free 
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, the target of environmentalists?6 The short 
answer is that the wro is viewed, at best, as indifferent to legitimate 
environmental concerns, and, at worst, as hostile to them.7 The wro has few, 
if any, friends among environmentalists, who vilify the wro and have made it 
their bele noire. 
Two events in the 1990s galvanized environmentalists in their antipathy 
toward the wro and free trade. The first event was the 1991 GAIT panel 
report in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute between Mexico and the United States.8 The 
second event was the 1998 wro panel and Appellate Body reports in the 
Shrimp/Turtle dispute between India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as 
complainants, and the United States, as respondent.9 
5. See, e.g., Hamilton Southworth III, Comment, GATT and the Envirol/l1lent-General 
Agreement on TariJfs alldTrade, Trade and the Environmtnt, GATT Doc. 1529 (FebTllmy 13, 1992),32 VA. 
J. INT'LL. 997 (1992); Steve Chamovitz, Envirol/l1lentalism Confronts GATT RHIn, Reant Developments 
& New 0pporilinities, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, at 37 (Apr. 1993); Symposium, Fret Trode and the 
Environment in Latin Amerim, 15 Loy. L.A. IN'C'L & COMPo L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium, Grrening 
the GATT: Setling the Agenda, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 447 (1994). 
6. John Dillin, NAFTAAgrrt11lent Trade-Pod Foes SOllnd Job uss, PoplilistAlarms, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 1; NAFTA's link to Environmental Poliaes, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Apr. 21, 1993, at 19. 
7. For a comparative analysis of the way in which trade and environment issues are resolved 
within the wro, the EU, and NAFTA, see Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in 
the EO, NAFTA, alld wrO: Reoonal Trajedories oJRHle Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1997). 
8. See GAIT Db-pute Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
GAITB.I.S.D., (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted 1991), rrprintedin30 I.L.M. 1594-1623 (1991). See 
also Richard W. Parker, The Use andAbl1St oJTrade Leverage to Proted the Global Commons: IPhat We Can 
Learn from the Tllna-Dolphin ConJlid, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTI... L. REV. 1 (1999); Matthew Hunter 
Hurlock, The GAIT, U.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in light oj the 
Tuna/ Dolphin Dedrion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2120-30 (1992); Frederic L. Kirgis,Jr., Environmtnt 
andTrode MeosllTlS After the Tllna/ Dolphin Dedrion, 49 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1221 (1992). See !,eneml!J 
Steve Chamovitz, EnvironmentalT rode Sanctions and the GATT: An Anafysis oj the Pel!J Amendment on 
Foreign Envirol/l1lental Practices, 9 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 751 (1994); Ted L. McDorman, The 
GATT ConsislenfJ oJU.s. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftn,t Fishing and SaPe Whalll, Dolphins and 
Tllrlles, 24 GEO. WASH.J. INT'LL.&EcoN. 477 (1991). 
For an overview of U.S. legislation that authorizes the imposition of unilateral trade 
sanctions on environmental grounds, see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILA nON OF U.S. ~DESTA"flITES 131-35 (Comm. Print 
1997). 
9. wro Panel Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, wr/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report], at 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm [hereinafter wro Website]. wro 
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What are environmentalists' specific misgivings about the wro and free 
trade? The following is a non-exhaustive list of the grievances environmentalists 
have with the wrO: 
• The WIO limits national sovereignty and thus restricts the environmental 
measures a country may wish to use. 
• The WIO rejects production-based grounds as a reason for excluding an 
imported product. 
• The WIO does not permit the imposition of countervailing duties on 
imports from countries with lax environmental laws. 
• The WIO encourages harmonization of product standards, which will lead 
to a lowering of standards rather than a raising of the standards. 
• The WIO prevents export bans on products (such as tropical timber), 
except in very narrowly defined circumstances. 
• The wro prevents the unilateral, extraterritorial imposition of 
environmental standards by one country on another. 
• The most-favored-nation obligation prohibits countries from treating one 
country differendy from another on the basis of different environmental 
policies in the two countries. 
• The WIO's dispute setdement mechanism is secretive and does not permit 
environmentalists to intervene to present environmental considerations in 
the decision making process.10 
In a nutshell, environmentalists fear that countries with comparatively more 
stringent environmental standards will relax them under pressure from domestic 
industries. In an environmental version of Gresham's law, stringent 
environmental standards will be lowered so that domestic producers can remain 
competitive at home, relative to imports from countries with less demanding 
environmental standards, as well as remain competitive abroad in export 
markets. It In addition, environmentalists seem convinced that developed 
Appellate Body on United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
wr /DS58/ AB/R (Oct 12, 1998)[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report], at wro 
Website, sHjJra note 9. Set alIo Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Tllrtle Displlte: 
ImplicatiollS for S oVfftign!J, the Environment, and IntmrationoiT rade Low, 71 U. COLO. L. RHV. 295 (2000); 
Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Tllrtk Cose: ImplicotiollS for Article XX of GATT and the Trade and 
Environment Debale, 22 Loy. LA. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 1 (1999). 
10. SetA Calaloglle ofGrievancu, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27,1993, at 26. See also Edith Brown 
Weiss, Environment and Trade os PorInm in Slistainable Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 
728, 729 (1992); forederick M. Abbott, Trade and Democrotic VallltS, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 31 
(1992). 
11. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1ntmrotional Trade and Proteclion of the Environment: The 
Con/inNing Seatrh for Rtronciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1997); Kym Anderson, The Enhvining of 
Tratle PolifJ wilh Environmental and Labollr S/andortls, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 435 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds. 1995); Hilary F. French, The 
GATT: Menalt or A!fJ?, WORLD WATCH, at 12 (Sept-Oct 1993); The Ralt for the Bot/om, THE 
EcONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 90; U.S. Int'I Trade Comm'n, Trade IsSlles of the 1990s-Part 1, INT'L 
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countries, long the leaders in protecting the environment, will rollback their 
standards to discourage capital and job flight to "pollution havens" where 
environmental regulation is lax or non-existent. Developing countries, on the 
other hand, fear that the agenda of environmental groups will be taken up by 
developed countries and used as an excuse to adopt protectionist border 
measures. 
The wro Secretariat, in its 1999 study on trade and environment, responded 
direcdy and indirecdy to some of these criticisms with the following conclusions 
of its own regarding the trade-environment relationship: 
• Most environmental problems result from polluting production processes, 
certain kinds of consumption, and the disposal of waste products. Trade as 
such is rarely the root cause of environmental degradation, except for the 
pollution associated with transportation of goods. 
• Environmental degradation occurs because producers and consumers are 
not always required to pay for the costs of their actions. 
• Environmental degradation is sometimes accentuated by policy failures, 
including government subsidies to polluting and resource-degrading 
activities, such as subsidies to agriculture and fishing. 
• Trade barriers generally make for poor environmental policy. 
Environmental problems are best addressed at their source. 
• The competitive effects of environmental regulations are minor for most 
industries. 
• Lillie evidence exists for the claim that polluting industries tend to migrate 
from developed to developing countries to reduce environmental 
compliance costs. 
• Not all kinds of economic growth are equally benign for the environment 
For example, economic growth based on energy-intensive industries is 
obviously not as benign to the environment as is economic growth driven 
by technological progress that saves inputs and reduces emissions. 
• Effective international cooperation is essential to protect the environment, 
especially regarding trans boundary and global environmental challenges. 
• The cooperative model of the wro, based on legal rights and obligations, 
could serve as a model for a new global architecture of environmental 
cooperation.12 
The wro Secretariat's report concluded that, even within its current mandate, 
the wro could do a few important things for the environment The most 
obvious contribution would be to address remaining trade barriers on 
environmental goods and services in order to reduce the costs of investing in 
clean production technologies and environmental management systems. Another 
ECON. REV., at 18 (Nov. 1994); U.S. Int'I Trade Comm'n, Trade Uberalization and Poll II/ion in 
ManNjactliting, IN'r'L ECON. REv., at 18 (March 1995). 
12. See wro SECRETARIAT, snpranote 3, at 1-8. 
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contribution would be to seek reductions in government subsidies that harm the 
environment, including energy, agriculture, and fishing subsidies.13 
The linkages and frictions, both legal and economic, between trade and the 
environment are undeniable. 14 Admittedly, the fit of international trade policy 
and international environmental policy is not well-tailored. Trade and 
environmental policies have proceeded at times on diverging tracks, at times on 
parallel tracks, and at other times on a collision course.IS Trade and 
environmental policies co-exist against a backdrop of significantly different 
economic and legal philosophies.16 The market economic model of government 
non-interference with the free flow of goods and services across national borders 
that is at the core of the GATI-WTO system has not found a niche in 
international environmental law. The market economy solution to the problem 
of pollution (i.e., "externalities," in economics terms) is to let the market, not the 
government, determine how and whether pollution is to be abated. But a market 
approach to abating environmental pollution has not worked well in practice. 
For that reason, international environmental law is more reflective of an 
economic model that invites and, arguably, requires government regulation of the 
market.17 For example, one solution to the pollution problem is to adopt the 
13. Stt wro SECRETARIAT, supra note 3, at 7. 
14. Set DANIEL C. &"Y, GREENING TIm GA1T: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND 'I1m 
FUTURE (1994). The wro Committee on Trade and the Environment has compiled a bibliography 
of over 150 works on trade and the environment. See wro, Committee on Trade and 
Environment, S tleded Biblio/,ro}fty on TraM and Bnviro1t1llent, wr/ CfE/W /49 (May 16, 1997). 
In its 1992 report, TraM and the Enviro1t1lltnt: Conjlids and 0ppor/llnjuu, the congres~ional 
Office of Technology Assessment notes that "[t]he potential for conflict between environmental 
concernll and international trade is increasing." U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECIINOI.OGY 
ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLlCfS AND OpPORTUNmIiS 3 (1992). 
15. Ste, e.g., WORLD BANK, DISCUSSION PAPER, TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY, AND TilE 
ENVIRONMENT (per G. Fredirksson ed. 1999); WORLD BANK, DISCUSSION PAPERS, 
iNTERNATIONALTRADEANDTHEENVIRONMENT (patrick Lowed. 1992)[hereinafterTRADEAND 
THE ENVIRONMENT); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Instillltional MiJjiIs: The GATT, The Iq & Trade-
Bnvironntent Displltu, 15 MICH. J. iNT'L 1- 1043 (1994); Daniel C. Esty, GAITing the Gmns, Not Jllst 
Grrenin/, the GATT, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1993, at 32; Charles R. l<1etcher, Gretning 
World T mM UJlII: Rlroncilinl. GAIT and Mliltiloteral EnvironmtnlalAt,rttnttnls Within the Existing World 
TraM ReNnte, 5 J. 1)lANSNA'I~L L. & POL'y 341 (1996); Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, 
TraM, Environmtllt and SlIStainable Developmtnt: A Prinm; 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo 1- REV. 535 
(1992); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, InltrllationalT raM Lnv I1I1dIntematiollalBnviro1t1lltnlalI..ow: Prrvtnuon 
and S el/knttnt olIntemational Bnviro1t1lltntal DUplitu in GAIT, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, Peb. 1993, at 43; 
Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evoldnl. Relationship Betwetn TraM and Enviro1t1lltntal 
Rlgllialioll, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1993, at 23 (1993). 
16. Su ROBERT REpETrO, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT POLICIES: ACHIEVING 
COMPLEMENTARmES AND AVOIDING CONFL1CfS (1993). 
17. Su ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNA110NALLY INTEGRATED 
GOODS (1995);John H. Jackson, WorldTraM RHIt.r and Enviro1t1llenlalPoliciu: Con/,T1Itnte or Conflict?, 
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''Polluter Pays Principle.,,18 Under such a principle, firms that pollute should be 
required to pay for the clean up and either absorb the cost or pass it on to the 
buyer in the form of higher prices for their goods (i.e., forcing the polluter to 
"internalize these costs,,).19 However, polluters are not likely to abate their 
pollution or pay for the cost of pollution controls voluntarily for the simple 
reason that they cannot rely on their competitors to voluntarily do likewise. 
Consequently, the government must mandate that they do so. In short, 
disenchanted with tnarket economy solutions to environmental problems, 
environmentalists challenge the assumption that markets are capable of 
protecting the environment effectively through setting prices.20 
This article challenges the view that the United States or other members of the 
wro have a legal right to impose trade measures unilaterally in order to resolve 
environmental disputes. On the contrary, the comprehensive legal and dispute 
settlement regime, created under wro auspices to regulate all governmental 
restrictions on cross-border trade in goods, precludes any wro member from 
unilaterally imposing border measures to block imports of goods from other 
wro members in response to conduct that allegedly threatens the environment 
or the global commons. The legality of such unilateral measures aside, this article 
further rejects the view that unilateral approaches to resolving international 
environmental disputes are desirable as a policy matter or are necessary as a 
practical matter. 
This article also examines the precautionary principle in the context of the 
GMO controversy, as well as the interface of the wro resolution of trade-
environment disputes with developing-country interests. It concludes that 
developing countries benefit greatly from the governance structure of the wro 
and offers some modest proposals for reform. 
II. REsOLVING TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES IN THE wro 
Reeling from its setbacks in the Tllna/Dolphin dispute, the United States 
successfully lobbied in the late stages of the Uruguay Round for the inclusion of 
49 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1227, 1231-32 (1992). 
18. See Candice Stevens, InlttpretingllN PolINl" P'!Js Principlt in lIN TmM and Envi"J1Inm,1 Conltxt, 
27 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 577 (1994). 
19. Id at 578. 
20. Set gentm/fJ DAVID W. PEARCE & JEREMY J. WARFORD, WORLD WITIIOUT END: 
ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SU!;TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1993); Herman E. Daly, Fro11l 
Atfjllst1llenl to StlStainablt Dtvtlop11lent: TIN Obslarlt ofFrtt TmM, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L& COMPo I~ Rr,;v. 
33, 34-42 (1992); Patti A. Goldman, IWolving lIN T mM and Bnvironnltnt Debate: In Starrh of a Nllllmi 
FOl7l11l and Nelllmi Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279, 1290-92 (1992); Michael J. Kelly, 
Ovmominl, Obstarlts to tIN Ejfortive Implementation ofInttrnationalBnviron11ltnlalAl,rtt11lents, 9 Goo. INTL 
ENVTL. L. REV. 447 (1997); Kelly Langru,NAFTA Implemenlingu!islation Unar/ain Bill Wilton S'!Js 
No Plan to Dtkg Passt1f,t, 10 INTL TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 415-16 (Mar. 10, 1993). 
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environment-friendly provisions in several Uruguay Round texts.21 Despite the 
many thorny and seemingly insoluble issues vying for their attention, the Uruguay 
Round negotiators managed to tum their attention to the issue of trade and the 
environment in the closing months of the Round. Several Uruguay Round 
documents reflect the negotiators' efforts. 
First, the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization makes environmental protection a high priority for wro members. 
The Preamble states: 
[Members] [r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards ofliving, ensuring 
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at differentlevels of economic 
development.22 
Second, the Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment issued at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round reiterates the views expressed in the Preamble 
to the wro Agreement, and adds the following: 
fI1here should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding 
and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading 
system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the environment, and the 
promotion of sustainable development on the other. , , .2.1 
In order to coordinate trade and environment policies, the ministers also 
established the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). Its terms of 
reference include identifying the relationship between trade and environmental 
measures and making recommendations on whether any modifications to the 
21. For an overview of environmental issues in the Uruguay Round, see OFFICE OF U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVn, THE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1163 (1994). 
22. Marrake.~h Agreement Establi~hing the World Trade Organization, l)reamble, Apr. 15, 
1994, [hereinafterWfO Agreement], THERESULTSOFTHEURUGUAYROUNDOFMULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 3 (1999) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS]. 
23. DECISION ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, adopted by Ministers on April 15, 1994, 
f1IH1iloble 0/ http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_e/envir_c/issu5_e.htm. 
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GA TT-WfO system are required?' The wro Secretariat has also been active 
in analyzing the relationship between trade and the environment.2S 
Third, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) strives 
for equal treatment of imported goods, regardless of their source of origin, 
through a nondiscrimination principle that operates at two levels: (1) 
nondiscrimination by an importing country among importers, and (2) 
nondiscrimination between imported goods and domestic like products. The 
unconditionalmost-favored-nation (MFN) obligation, codified in GATT Article 
1:1, requires that a wro member treat imports from another wro member on 
an equal, nondiscriminatory basis vis-a-vis all other members' imports. The 
MFN obligation is {'unconditional" in the sense that MFN treatment must be 
accorded all imports from wro members, regardless of country of origin, and 
regardless of whether the exporting member negotiated reciprocal trade 
concessions with the importing member. The national treatment obligation, 
codified in GATT Article III:4,generallyprohibits discrimination against imports 
vis-a-vis domestic like products by wro members. When an importing 
member's environmental standards discriminate against imported goods in favor 
of domestic like products, the exporting member may have a legitimate complaint 
under Article XXIII that a trade benefit has been nullified or impaired Similarly, 
to the extent the importing member's environmental regulations purport to have 
an extraterritorial effect (for example, by targeting the production processes and 
methods by which the imported product was manufactured or processed in the 
exporting member), the national treatment obligation also may be violated. 
In addition to GATT's two non-discrimination rules, the most important of 
the original GATT commitments respecting non-tariff barriers to trade is the 
Article XI commitment to eliminate quantitative restrictions (quotas) on imports 
and exports. Under the terms of Article XI, an import embargo on goods from 
another WfO member is illegal unless it satisfies one of the GATT Article XX 
exceptions. 
Despite its commitment to the goal of liberal trade, GATT does permit wro 
members to restrict imports on a number of specific grounds. Of the ten 
enumerated GATT Article XX general exceptions, the public health and safety 
exception and the exception for conservation of natural resources touch most 
24. In July 2000, the Committee on Trade and Environment addressed the issue of the 
relationship between the wro and multilateral environmental agreements. See wro Press Rek-ase, 
CTE Holds InJof7llotion S usion with MEAJOndAridresfeJ the fulationship bel1Veen the w:ro and MEAs, the 
Export ojDol1mtiCfl/fJ ProhibiledGoods, the TRlPsAgm11lenf alldFishtries Subsidies, PRESS/TE/033 Ouly 
10,2000), available at http://www.wto.org Qa.~t visited Sept. 20, 2000). 
25. See wro SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1999), at http:// 
www.wto.org/wto/environ/environment.pd£ For a critique of the Secretariat's report, see Steve 
Charnovitz, World TraM and the Environment: A Revielll of the Nelli w:ro &port, 12 Goo. IN1~I,ENvn.. 
1.. REV. 523 (2000). 
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directly on the enforcement of environmenta1laws and reguIations.26 These two 
GAIT Article XX exceptions provide: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.27 
In order for an importing country to impose a GAIT-permissible health or 
safety border measure, that measure (1) must be necessary (i.e., no less trade 
restrictive alternative is available), (2) must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between countries where the same conditions prevail (i.e., it must be 
consistent with the MFN and national treatment obligations), and (3) must not 
be a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Considering the open-textured quality of the terms "necessary," "arbitrarily," 
and "unjustifiably," the public health and safety exception has the obvious 
potential for being a rich source of formidable nontariffbarriers to trade. Given 
the vagaries of the public health and safety exception, the potential for abuse by 
economically powerful countries anxious to foist their own brand of 
environmental protection upon weaker trading nations is ever present. GATT 
practice generally has been to construe Article XX narrowly in favor of trade and 
against nontariff barriers to trade. In a highly instructive GATT panel report, 
Thai Cigarettes,28 the panel concluded that the Thai ban on imported cigarettes 
was not "necessary" within the meaning of the chapeau to GAIT Article XX: 
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GAIT 
provision as "necessary" ... if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be 
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GAIT provisions is 
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other 
GAIT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, 
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree 
of inconsistency with other GAIT provisions.29 
26. For an overview and inventory of GAIT provisions dealing with environmental issues. 
see Housman & Zaelke, S1IjJm note 15, at 535. 
27. Craig A.A. Dixon, Environmental Sll~ ofWTO DUplitt Pt11Itl Dtcinons Since 1995: 'TmM 
at 01/ Costs?, "24 WM & MARY ENVT'L. L. & POL'y REV. 89,93-94 (2000). 
28. GAIT l'anel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes 
on Cigarettes. 1990. GAIT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) 200 (1990). 
29. GAIT Panel Report on United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 1989. 
GA'IT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 392-93,15.26 (1989). Sttgentm~ Dixon. stpranote 27, at 93. 
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This intetpretation of "necessary" restates the minimum derogation principle. 
In other words, any measure taken under one of the Article XX exceptions must 
be the least trade restrictive measure available. 
Equally instructive and more germane to the theme of this paper is the 
Appellate Body's rulingin the Shrimp/Tuttle dispute. Article XX(g) exempts from 
the MFN and national treatment commitments, trade measures" 'relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.' ,,30 
The Appellate Body concluded that textually Article XX(g) is not limited to non-
living natural resources, but extends to living resources as well. Rejecting 
Malaysia's "original intent" argument that Article XX(g) was intended to cover 
non-living resources only, the Appellate Body stated: 
The words of Article XX(g), "exhaustible natural resources," were actually crafted 
more than SO years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment .... 
From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the wro Agreement [explicitly 
acknowledging the objective of sustainable development], we note that the generic 
te1lIl "natural resources" in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its content or reference 
but is rather "by definition, evolutionary."31 
Moreover, the Appellate Body added, two adopted GATT 1947 panel reports, 
United States--Prohibition ojlmpotts ojTuna and Tuna Products from Canada,32 and 
Canada-Measures Affecting Expotts oj Unprocessed Hemng and Salmon,33 that found 
fish to be an "exhaustible natural resource" within the meaning of Article XX(g). 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that measures to conserve exhaustible 
resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX(g).3-J The 
Appellate Body further found that sea turtles are an exhaustible natural resource. 
Turning next to the issue of whether the U.S. measure was one "relating to the 
conservation of" exhaustible natural resources, the Appellate Body found a 
substantial relationship between Section 609 of the Endangered Species AC~5 and 
its implementing regulations, on the one hand, and the conservation of sea 
turtles, on the other. The Appellate Body stated that "[t]he means [i.e., turtle 
30. Housman & Zaelke, snpra note 15, at 550. 
31. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, snpronote 9, at 48, VJl129-30. 
32. GAIT Panel Report on United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada, Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) 91 (1982). 
33. GATT Panel Report on Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon, 1989, GA'IT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) 98 (1989). 
34. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, mpronote 9, at 50,1131. 
35. 16 V.S.c. § 1537 (1994). 
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excluder devices or 1EDs] are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends ~.e., 
the conservation of sea turtles].,,36 
Addressing the last Article XX(g) criterion-that the measure is made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption-the 
Appellate Body found that this requirement was easily satisfied. U.S. shrimpers 
who fail to use TEDs face serious civil and criminal penalties, including forfeiture 
of their trawlers. The Appellate Body concluded, "[w]e believe that, in principle, 
Section 609 is an even-handed measure.,,37 
Having concluded that Section 609 is provisionally justified under the Article 
XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body next tackled the thorny issue of whether 
Section 609 violates the Article XX chapeau. The Appellate Body, reflecting on 
the fact that the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the wro calls for the 
"optimal use of the world's resources ... in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development," and the creation of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment and its terms of reference, noted that these developments "must 
add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed 
to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994."38 Nevertheless, the 
Appellate Body found that: 
[I]t is not acceptable ... for one wro Member to use an economic embargo to 
"qui" other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory 
program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's 
territory, without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in 
the territories of those other Members.J? 
The Appellate Body added that the protection and conservation of highly 
migratory species of sea turtles demands concerted and cooperative efforts on 
the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed by sea turdes. In the 
Appellate Body's view, except for the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turdes, the United States had failed to 
exhaust multilateral efforts.4o Rather than attempt to exhaust international 
mechanisms, the United States instead pursued the unilateral application of 
Section 609. In a footnote, the Appellate Body underscored this point with the 
observation that the United States, a party to CITES;11 made no attempt to raise 
36. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, mpra note 9, at 53,11141. 
37. Id at 55,1144. 
38. rtf. at 58, 1 153. 
39. rtf. at 65,1164. 
40. rtf. at 66-67, 70, 'Il'i 167-68, 171-72 Parties to the Inter-American Convention include 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezue1a, and the United States. 
41. Multilateral Intemational Tmde in Endangered Species ofWtld Fauna and Flom, Mar. 
3,1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249,993 U.N.T.S. 243, tntmdinloforceJan. 7, 1975; see 
OECD, EXPERIENCE WITH TilE USE OF TRADE MEASURES IN TIlE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA (CITES), 
OCDE/GD(97)106 (1997), ovoilab/e 01 http://www.oecd.org.; William Bums, CITES ond the 
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the issue of sea turtle mortality due to shrimp trawling in the CI1ES Standing 
Committee.~2 The Appellate Body also faulted the United States for acting in a 
discriminatory manner vis-a-vis shrimp exporting members (Central and South 
American shrimp exporters were given preferential treatment under Section 609 
vis-a-vis shrimpers from the four complaining Asian members), as well as for the 
lack of adequate transparency in the administration of the Section 609 
certification procedures. 
Anticipating the firestorm of criticism that its decision would generate within 
the environmental community, the Appellate Body launched a preemptive first 
strike with the following closing observations: 
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in 
this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the 
environment is of no significance to the Members of the wrO. Clearly, it is. We 
have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the wro cannot 
adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. 
Clearly, they can and should. And we have lIotdecided that sovereign states should 
not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally; either within the wro 
or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise 
protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.43 
In sum, the Appellate Body found Section 609 flawed chiefly in the manner in 
which the United States administered it, not with the substance of the law per se 
or its objectives. It recognized a country's right to protect sea turtles, provided 
that country did so by negotiating bilateral or multilateral species protection 
agreements rather than by imposing its preferences unilaterally. 
III. WHY UNILATERALISM Is WRONG As A MATTER OF LAW 
Under customary intemationallaw, legislative jurisdiction may be grounded 
on five bases: territoriality, nationality, passive personality, national security (the 
protective principle), and effects.oU Of these five bases oflegislative jurisdiction, 
the territoriality and effects principles are the two bearing most directly on the 
question of the application of national environmental laws. National 
enforcement authorities rely heavily, but not exclusively, on the territoriality 
principle as the legal basis on which to regulate unlawful acts of environmental 
&gHIo/ion ofIn/mta/ionaITrade in EndnngeredSpecit.r ofF/ora: A Cn/ito/Appraisal, 8 DICK. J. INT'LL. 203 
(1989). 
42. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, mpra note 9, at 70, n.174. 
43. It!. at 75,1 185 (emphasis in original). For additional analyses of the Shrimp/Turtle 
reports, see Neuling, slIJIranote 9, at 1; Richards & McCrory, mpranote 9, at 295. 
44. See RESTATEMENT (fiIlRD) OF1liE FOREIGN RELATIONSLAWOFTHE UNITED STATES 
§ 402 (1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Set gentro/fy J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIIS/omary 
ltr/mtational Low, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000). 
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degradation that occur within the territory of the enforcing state.45 The 
territoriality principle provides a sufficient basis for enforcing national 
environmental laws in most instances. The effects basis for legislative 
jurisdiction-in reality, merely an extension of the territoriality 
principle--extends the regulatory reach of national environmental laws to cases 
where adverse environmental effects occur within a country from acts that take 
place outside the territory of the country. Cross-border air and water pollution 
are two prime examples. However, the territoriality and effects principles, even 
if interpreted liberally, fall short as a legal basis for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in international environmental cases involving the global commons. 
Moreover, only if a state is the victim of a violation of an international obligation 
by another state may it resort to unilateral countermeasures that might otherwise 
be unlawful, short of the use of force.46 The killing of marine mammals and 
reptiles is not a violation of a customary international obligation.47 
Besides the customary international law prohibition against the extraterritorial 
application of national laws generally, the legal prohibition against unilateralism 
in the trade-environment context has a treaty-based or conventional foundation 
as well. The core GAIT obligations not to discriminate against imports 
regardless of their origin (the Article I MFN commitment), the obligation not to 
discriminate against imports vis-a-vis the like domestic product (the Article III 
national treatment obligation), and the commitment not to impose quotas on 
imports (the Article XI prohibition on quotas) are, of course, binding 
international legal obligations.-18 The panel report in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, 
and the Appellate Body report in Shrimp/Turtle, make it clear that unilateral trade 
measures to force compliance with national environmental laws are GAIT-illegal. 
Beyond the core GAIT obligations, the wro Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) puts flesh on the bare 
bones of the core GAIT commitments, and the improved dispute resolution 
mechanism adds teeth. They establish a comprehensive legal regime that restricts 
45. Stt RE.'ITATEMENT, slljJrn note 44, § 402; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES Oil PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL I ..... w 300 (1990). The nationality principle can also be the basis for extending 
antitrust jurisdiction beyond national borders when nationals of the enforcing government engage 
in conduct overseas. A potential source of friction here is defining a ftrm's nationality. Prescriptive 
jurisdiction is to be distinguished from enforcement jurisdiction. 
46. Stt RESTATEMENT, slljJrn note 44, § 905. 
47. Although the REsTATEMENT (fHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF "ll-IE 
UNITED STATES declares that a state is responsible to other states for any b-lgnificant injury to the 
environment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, see it!. § 601, the introductory note 
and the commentary refer to cases of water and air pollution, not to cases of involving the killing 
of marine mammals or reptiles. Set it!. § 601, reporters' note 2; § 602 (remedies for pollution); § 603 
(state responsibility for marine pollution); § 604 (remedies for marine pollution). Moreover, 
"~ignificant" injury is required, such a.~ massive pollution. S tt it!. § 601, reporters' note 3. 
48. Set James It Arnold, The Oilseeds Displllt and tht ValiditJ ojUniialtfl1lism in a Muliiloltral 
ConttXt, 30 STAN.J. INT'LL. 187, 194-95 (1994). 
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and, in some cases, prohibits the imposition of border measures on the grounds 
of health, safety, and other environmental concerns. The binding dispute 
settlement mechanism established under the wro Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) is currently the exclusive mechanism for resolving trade-
environment disputes, failing a negotiated settlement.49 As a wro member. the 
United States is bound to observe the legal obligations of this comprehensive 
international trade law regime in which all trade-environment disputes are to be 
resolved in a bilateral/multilateral forum under wro auspices. 
There once may have been a time when a colorable argument could have been 
made that unilateralism was permitted under GAIT 1947,50 given the many 
defects in its dispute settlement mechanism. Criticisms of the dispute settlement 
process under GAIT 1947 were legion and will not be recounted in depth here. 51 
The most frequently recurring complaints about dispute settlement under GAIT 
1947 included the following: 
• GAIT lacked an integrated dispute settlement procedure, with the Tokyo 
Round Codes containing independent dispute settlement provisions. 
• GAIT disputes were sometimes resolved through the grant of waivers. 
• Small countries were handicapped in achieving effective results against large 
countries. 
• The GAIT panel process was lengthy and subject to delaying tactics. 
• GAIT contained no provision for the automatic establishment of a panel. 
• Inadequate staff and experts often hamstrung panels in their fact finding. 
• The insistence on approval of panel reports by consensus permitted the 
losing country to block adoption of reports. 
• GAIT panel decisions are not appealable. 
• Effective enforcement and sanctions were almost nonexistent, with the 
exception of unilateral retaliation. 
• GAIT did not require notification of the implementation of a panel 
recommendation. 
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) 
49. This statement assumes that no multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) to which 
both of the disputing parties are ~-jgnatories exists that authorizes the imposition of trade ml!aSUres 
in the event of a violation of the MEA. 
50. See Arnold, slljJm note 48, at 199-203. 
51. For an analysis of dispute settlement under GATI 1947 and criticisms of that process, 
see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION Of'THE 
MODERN GATILooALSYSTEM (1993);jOHN H.jACKSON,RESTIWcrURING THEGA TISYSTEM 
(1990); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE EFFEcrlVENESS Of' TRADE DISPUTE 
SETILEMENT UNDER THE GA TI AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, USITC Pub. 1793 
(1985); PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF wro DISPUTE SETILEMENT (2000); Robert 
E. Hudec, A StotistiCl11 Profile of the GAIT Dispule Selllemtlll Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. j. GLOBAL 
TRADE 1 (1993). 
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addresses almost all of these criticisms. As noted in DSU Article 3.2, "[t]he 
dispute settlement system of the wro is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system.,m To that end, the DSU 
establishes an integrated, rules-based dispute settlement process with a right of 
appellate review. The DSU virtually assures that all panel or Appellate Body 
reports will be adopted expeditiously and without modification.53 Such has been 
the practice to date. 
Article 21.1 recognizes that prompt compliance with Dispute SettlementBody 
(DSB) recommendations is essential to the effective resolution of disputes. The 
DSB is the name given to the wro General Council when it takes action under 
the DSU. The member found to have violated a multilateral trade agreement 
("the Member concerned" is the term used in the DSU) must state its intentions 
regarding the implementation of the recommendations at a Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) meeting held within 30 days after a report has been adopted. If 
immediate compliance is impracticable, then a member may have "a reasonable 
period of time" within which to comply.54 A reasonable period of time can be 
the period of time proposed by the member with the approval of the DSB, 
generally not to exceed 15 months measured from the date of the establishment 
of the panel. In no event is it to exceed (1) 18 months, unless the parties so 
agree; (2) a period of time mutually agreed to by the parties to the dispute; or (3) 
a period of time determined through binding arbitration, generally not to exceed 
15 months from the date of adoption of the report.55 
52 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
[hereinafter DSU), wro Agreement, Annex 2, art. 3.2, LEGAL TEXTS, slljJra note 22, at 354. 
53. For additional analyses of the WI'O dispute settlement process, see FRANKW. SWACKER, 
ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WfO) AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995); Grant Aldonas, The WorldTrtHkOrgallization: Rlvomtion in In/emotional 
Trade DispliteSettllments, 50 DISP. RESOL.J. 73 Ouly 1995);Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.s. 
TmM Lalli and PolifJ Series No. 24: Displlte Rmmtion in the Nelli WorldTmM O'l,anifPtion: Concerns and 
N,t Bmtjits, 28 INT'L LAw. 1095 (1994); Judith Hipler Bello, The WTO Displlte Settlemmt 
UlIdmtalldinl': LesJ Is MoTt, 90 AM. J. INT'L L 416 (1996); John H. Jackson, The wro Displlte 
S ,ttkmmt Undmtandin,rMisNlIdmtandingon theNatNTt ojLegalObligalion, 91 AM.J. INT'LL. 60 (1997); 
Azar M. Khansari, Starrhingfor the Petftd SolNtion: International DispNtt RmlNlion and the Nelli World 
TmM 0'l.anization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L& COMPo L REV. 183 (1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rem,dits 
Along Rlith Rights: Instillltional Rtfornt in the NtIII GAIT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Curtis Reitz, 
Enforrtmtnt of the General AgTttmtnt on Toriffi and TraM, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L 555 (1996); 
Michael K. Young, Displllt RlsolNtion in th, UT1IgN'!] RoNnd: Ltmflers TriNmph Ovtr Diplomats, 29 INT'L 
LAW. 389 (1995). 
54. Stt DSU, slljJm note 52, art. 21.3. 
55. Sttid arts. 21.3(a)-(c), 21.4. Set, '.g., Award of the Arbitrator,Japan---.:raxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21(3)(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WI' /DS8/15, at 9, 1 27 (1997)(concluding that "reasonable 
period of time" within the meaning ofDSU Article 21.3(c) i.~ 15 months under the circumstances). 
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If there is a disagreement over whether a member has in fact complied with 
a DSB recommendation, the matter may be referred to the original pand for its 
determination of this issue.56 Its report is to be circulated within 90 days after 
referral. Until the matter is satisfactorily resolved, it is to remain on the DSB's 
agenda with the member concerned giving a status report of its progress on the 
implementation of the recommendation.57 
Full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity 
with an Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement (MTA) is the DSU's 
preferred method for resolving a wro dispute.58 The rationale is that by 
removing the offending measure trade liberalization is promoted and trade 
equilibrium is restored. In terms of a complete remedy, however, the aggrieved 
member is not necessarily made whole soldy by the removal of the offending 
measure. The specific remedy of removing the offending measure may not 
compensate the complaining member for any trade losses it may have suffered 
as a result of the responding member's violation. However, in cases involving, 
for example, an improper assessment of ordinary customs duties, antidumping 
duties, or countervailing duties, refund procedures exist under national law. 
Failing full implementation of a DSB recommendation, DSU Article 22 
authorizes compensation to a complaining member from an offending member 
on terms mutually agreed to between the disputing members.59 Compensation 
might restore the overall balance of trade liberalization that existed prior to the 
dispute if, for example, the offending member offers to reduce tariffs on 
products of export interest to the complaining member. However, any 
compensation agreement in the form of improved market access for the 
complaining member's goods must be "consistent with the covered 
agreements.,,611 Specifically, it must be instituted on an MFN basis, thereby 
generalizing the benefit of the compensation to all wro members. 
Failing conclusion of a compensation agreement within 20 days after the 
expiration of a reasonable period of time for implementing a recommendation, 
a complaining member may request the DSB to authorize the suspension of 
concessions limited solely to the member concerned. The suspension need not 
occur on an MFN basis. This limitation is a form of damage contro1, thereby 
minimizing the negative trade impact of retaliation. 
Regarding the suspension of concessions, the general principle is that the 
complaining member should first seek to suspend concessions with respect to the 
same sector in which the violation occurred, i.e., cross-sector retaliation is 
discouraged. For example, with respect to a trade-in-goods violation, a 
suspension of concessions may take place with regard to goods generally. If the 
56. See DSU, supra note 52, art. 21.5. 
57. See it!. art. 21.6. 
58. See it!. art. 22.1. 
59. See it!. art. 22.2. 
60. It!. art. 22.1. 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has been violated, then the 
suspension should focus on the principal service sector affected (there are eleven, 
including, for example, telecommunications and financial services). If the TRIPS 
Agreement has been violated, then the suspension should focus on the specific 
intellectual property right that was violated (e.g., patent, trademark, copyright).6J 
If a sector-specific suspension is not practicable or effective, then the 
suspension may be in other sectors under the same agreement (e.g., suspension 
of telecommunications trade benefits in retaliation for a financial services 
violation). If such retaliation is not practicable or effective, or the circumstances 
are serious enough, then suspension under another agreement may be 
authorlzed.62 The level of the suspension is to be equivalent to the level of the 
nullification or impairment. If the member concerned objects to the proposed 
level of suspension or to cross-sector retaliation, the matter is to be referred to 
binding arbitration, which is to be completed within 60 days.63 
In a flank attack on unilateral actions taken by the United States under Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, M DSU Article 23, Strengthening the Multilateral System, 
flatly prohibits members from making unilateral determinations on the following 
matters: (1) whether an Uruguay Round agreement has been violated, (2) whether 
another member has failed to implement a DSB recommendation within a 
reasonable period of time, or (3) whether the level of suspension of concessions 
is appropriate. The DSU is the exclusive mechanism for resolving these issues, 
absent the mutual agreement of the disputing members.65 
In summary, the WTO MTAs and fundamental GAIT obligations establish 
a legal framework that ensures that trade in goods will not be impeded because 
of government-sanctioned barriers. Regardless of whether this legal regime is 
now deemed to be harmful to the environment, the inescapable fact is that the 
United States and the other WTO members have made a commitment to these 
legal rules. Under Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the 
unilateral imposition of trade measures in response to a violation of a wro 
member's rights under GAIT or a wro agreement is impermissible. With the 
adoption of the DSU, the wro has in place institutional structures and 
procedures designed to resolve trade disputes with an environment sub text. This 
institutional framework calls for the resolution of trade-environment disputes 
multilaterally through the panel and Appellate Body process, or bilaterally 
61. See DSU, slIjJra note 52, art. 22.3(f). 
62. Set it!. art. 22.3. For example, Ecuador was authorized to cross-retaliate against the EU 
in the Bananas Case by cross-retaliating in the services and intellectual property sectors mther than 
being compensated in the goods sector. Set Daniel Pruzin, EC1IadorGtls WTO Go-Ahtad /0 fu/alia/e 
Agains/ Ellroptan Union, 17 Int'l Tmde Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 832 (May 25, 2000). 
63. See DSU, slIjJT'fJ note 52, art. 22.6. 
64. 'The Tmde Act of 1974,19 U.S.c. § 2411 (1994). 
65. In lieu of DSU panel proceedings, authorizes disputing members to mutually agree to 
resolve their dh.l'ute through binding arbitmtion, see DSU, SlljJT'fJ note 52, art. 25. 
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through consultation and negotiation. Unilateralism is totally rejected as an 
option. 
The United States is obligated to perform its legal obligations under these 
international agreements in good faith.66 Its resort to unilateral trade measures 
to resolve environmental disputes, in the face of a binding international 
agreement that forbids such border measures except in limited circumstances and 
in the face of GAIT and wro dispute settlement reports that have consistendy 
condemned unilateralism, is extraterritorial application of domestic law. 
Additionally, its use of border measures to enforce certain domestic 
environmental legislation that targets foreign production processes and methods, 
falls short of good faith performance. When a country commits to a multilateral 
rules-based regime with a binding dispute settlement mechanism such as the 
WTO, it forfeits the right to unilaterally impose trade measures to achieve an 
environmental goal, unless authorized to do so by the wrO. 
IV. WHY UNlLATERALISM Is WRONG A..<:; A MA'ITER OF POLICY 
Beyond the question of the legality of unilateral trade measures to resolve 
environmental disputes, the United States has learned the hard way that 
unilateralism is a double-edged sword. In a dispute in the mid-1990s with the EU 
over the use of leghold traps, the United States came close to being on the 
receiving end of a unilateral EU import ban on fur from animals caught with 
such traps. It was only after extensive bilateral negotiations that the parties were 
able to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of their dispute.67 The recent, and 
as yet unresolved, GMO controversy (discussed below) is another lesson for the 
United States that unilateralism is not a one-way street. 
Few will quarrel that protecting the environment should be a high priority for 
every country, and especially for the developed-country members of the wrO. 
However, with environmentalists portraying the wro as being, at best, 
indifferent to environmental issues and, at worst, hostile to them, can 
environmental concerns be adequately accommodated under the GAIT-wrO 
system?68 
66. RE..'ITATEMENT, -"pm note 44, § 321; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 enltftdin/o fom Jan. 27,1988, (stating that "[e] very treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.'). 
67 . See EU, U.S. Ream Ammi on PhtJIeolit of ul,hold Trojn, Alltmnl, Fur Import Ban, 14 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 48, at 2076 (Dec. 3, 1997). 
68. Set I,tneml!J Jackson, supm note 17; K. Gwen Beacham, Intmlational Tmde and the 
Environmtnt: Impli&t1tions of the Gtneml Agrtt11ltnt on Toriffi t11Id Trade for the Fu/lift of Environmental 
Protection Eiforts, 3 COW.J. INT'LENVTL. L & POL'y 655 (1992); Dunoff, supmnote 15, at 1407; 
Kevin C. Kennedy, Refomtinl, U.s. T mde Polig to Protect the GlobalEnvironment:A MlIltihtemlApproach, 
18 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 185 (1994); Schoenbaum, -"pm note 11. 
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The need for greater integration of trade and environmental policies is 
undeniable. As an initial matter, such policies need not be mutually exclusive.69 
As one economist has observed, "[m]ost environmental policies are not in 
conflict with basic GA TI rules.,,70 Environmentalists seem to have an endless 
list of grievances with the GATI-WI'O system. If their real concern is that 
liberal trade may reduce worldwide environmental standards to the lowest 
common denominator, then the problem lies with the market's failure to reflect 
environmental costs in prices and in government subsidization of polluting 
industries.71 
Resorting to import bans to address environmental issues may be misguided 
for several reasons. First, import bans on goods produced by polluting 
production processes and methods rarely attack the root of the problem. 
Second, such import bans, when advocated by environmental groups with the 
support of domestic business and labor groups, may have as their primary aim 
trade protectionism, not environmental protection. Such advocacy can be 
especially pernicious because it is so socially respectable.72 Import bans can in 
turn lead to an escalation of trade tensions that trigger retaliatory trade responses 
by exporting countries. 
Moreover, economic studies have shown that tough environmental standards 
at home do not, standing alone, cause companies to relocate abroad.73 As 
Professor Edith Brown Weiss points out, there is little empirical evidence to 
substantiate the claim that countries with lax environmental standards attract 
foreign industries that are heavily regulated.74 Environmental costs are just one 
factor among many that figure in the decision to make a foreign investment. 
Other factors, such as labor costs, transportation infrastructure, market access, 
political stability, tax and labor laws, joint venture laws, performance 
requirements, the ability to repatriate profits, currency stability, and 
compensation in the event of expropriation figure more prominently in either the 
location/relocation and investment decisions.75 
69. See, e.g., CONFRONTING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLlCl'S: PROSPECTS AND 
PRACTICAL ApPROACHES (ABA 1993); C. FORD RUNGE, ET AL., FREER TRADE, PROTECfED 
ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994); 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, mpra note 15; DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Jonathan Scott Miles, Doing the 
Right Thingfor Profit: Markets, TraM, andAdVf11lcing Environmental Protection, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 611 
(1996). 
70. Piritta Sorsa, GAIT and Environment: Basic 1sSlits and Some Developing COllntry ConCtl7lS, in 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, mpra note 15, at 327. 
71. See id, at 325 n.3. 
72. See Anderson, mpranote 11, at 441. 
73. See The Greening ojProtec/ionism, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25. 
74. See Weiss, mpra note 10, at 729. 
75. Seeid 
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It is not surprising that international trade measures have become the 
mechanism of choice for responding in a concrete way to other countries' 
behavior that threatens the environment. First, import bans are high profile and, 
therefore, potentially of great symbolic value. Second, trade measures do not 
involve or threaten the use of armed force (except, of course, "quarantines" such 
as the one imposed by the United States against Cuba during the Cuban missile 
crisis or against Iraq during the Gulf War). Third, building an intemational 
consensus on the need for, or the wisdom of, imposing import bans presents 
national policy makers with a tough challenge.76 It is undoubtedly easier to build 
a consensus at home on the merits of unilaterally initiating import bans than it 
is to build an international consensus.77 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that environmentalists have implemented 
techniques similar to those used in the fields of national security and human 
rights by embracing import bans and restrictions as the preferred method for 
forcing nations that trade with the United States to adopt U.S.-style measures for 
protecting the environment. Indeed, the use of trade measures to enforce 
environmental standards can be compelling, particularly when international trade 
is the direct cause of the environmental damage as it is, for example, with trade 
in hazardous waste or in endangered species. 
Although import bans have an obvious and understandable appeal, the one 
question environmentalists have either failed to ask or have ignored is whether 
import bans are effective. The symbolic value of import bans, highly touted in 
the human rights arena, should not be completely discounted even when the ends 
are environmental. But at the same time, the role of symbolism should not be 
overrated or overemphasized. Symbolism may be a necessary condition for 
imposing import bans against a country with a less-than-exemplary 
environmental track record, as measured by U.S. standards. But symbolism 
standing alone should never be a sufficient condition for imposing such 
sanctions. 
Moving beyond symbolism, the primary focus should be on the effectiveness 
of import bans as a means for achieving certain environmental ends.78 The 
question that needs to be answered before unilateral import bans are imposed is 
whether the imposition of sanctions will cause the exporting country to change 
its environmental policies. The effectiveness of import bans ought to be the 
76. Even doing so at the nationallevd can be problematic. An example was the perennial 
tug-of-war between Congress and Presidents Bush and Clinton over whether China's most-favored-
nation trade status should be renewed despite its human rights record. See China fuocls 10 U.s. Trode 
Decision, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1990, at 3; Senole Smloin.r Pmidtnt'.r Velo oj BiU 
ConditioningMFN Stolll.rjorChino, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at 518 (Mar. 25, 1992). 
77. See Alan O. Sykes, COlI!lrllctive Ullilaterol Threot.r ill Inlmratiollol Commerriol fulolioll.r: The 
Limited Ca.rejorSectioll J01, 23 LAW & POL'y INT'LBus. 263 (1992). 
78. See Richard W. Parker, The Problem wilh SCfJmorti.r: How (ond How Not) to Met1SllT'r lhe Co.rt· 
B.ffectivt11m ojBCfJnontic SOlldioll!, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 235 (2000). 
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initial focus and, ultimately, the bottom line. Otherwise, legitimate environmental 
concerns, when coupled with strong trade protectionist pressures at home, can 
result in the imposition of import bans that are imposed ostensibly on 
environmental grounds, but which have the potential for hobbling the global 
economy. The imposition of unilateral trade measures withouta resultant change 
in behavior of the target country means a net loss in world trade and a net loss 
for species preservation. 
Environmental protection, in combination with trade protectionism, can lead 
to an undisciplined, indiscriminate use of import bans. COhsequently, when 
import bans are invoked on environmental grounds, they need to be used in a 
very disciplined and discriminating fashion.79 Once a country imposes import 
bans, it may be impossible to avoid the downward spiral of retaliation and 
counter-retaliation, leading to an all-out trade war.so In any such war, the 
environment could be the big loser. An importing country's use of trade 
restrictions to block imports in the name of environmental protection may 
actually be in conflict with the goal of environmental protection. Such 
restrictions may promote environmental degradation by protecting less efficient 
manufacturers and producers from more efficiently produced imports. 
In the name of environmental protection, a substantial volume of import trade 
could be significantly affected through the use of trade measures imposed 
ostensibly to advance environmental goals, but which are in fact pretextual and 
nothing more than disguised nontariff barriers to trade.sl Domestic business 
interests and unions anxious to erect barriers to import competition from low-
wage countries may drape themselves in the green flag and join forces with 
environmental groupS.82 Together they may forge a coalition to pressure 
79. For a 1990 case study on the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool that offers 
some insights to this question, see GARY C. HUFBAUER, ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCfIONS 
RECONSIDERED, HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 38 (1990). To the question, "[a)re economic 
~anctions effective?" Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott give a guarded answer of "sometimes": 
Although it is not true that sanctions 'never work,' they are of limited utility 
in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country 
to take actions it stoutly resists. Still, in some instances, particularly situations 
involving small target countries and relatively modest policy goals, sanctions 
have helped alter foreign behavior. 
Id at 92 The authors conclude that sanctions are seldom effective in bringing about major changes 
in the policies of the target country. For a critique of this work, see Parker, mpra note 7S. 
SO. S'I, l.g., Clayton Jones,Japon Fires a Shot 0,," BOlli of Clinton's 'MonogldT rade: CHRI!>lIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 1993, at 1. 
S1. See John Dillin, WiJh US Job! oj Stoke, Conl,res! Tolu! W Dry Vielll of Trade Pod, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17,1993, at 1,4 (reporting that "some Mexicans worry that the US will use 
environmental standards as a form of protectionism''). 
S2. As reported in The BcgnomitJ, "[o)ne recent attack on GAIT by l'ublic Citizen Iheaded 
by Ralph Nader) was liigned by over 300 groups. They included the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers Union, the United Methodist Church, the Arnerican Cetacean Society and the Sierra Club," 
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government regulators to keep the playing field level by restricting imported 
products that are manufactured or processed by heavily polluting industries in 
countries where environmental controls are either less stringent, loosely enforced, 
or non-existent. 
One writer has compared this informal coalition among protectionist domestic 
business interests, unions, and environmental groups to an unholy alliance 
between the Baptists and the boodeggers.83 The environmentalists are the 
Baptists who support prohibition on grounds of morality and health. Business 
and labor groups are the boodeggers who support prohibition in order to 
preserve jobs and their share of the domestic market from import competition. 
The lesson to be drawn is beware of domestic manufacturers and unions who 
lament the state of the environment in other countries. They may be shedding 
crocodile tears for the environment. 
Instead of viewing free trade and environmental protection as mutually 
reinforcing, environmentalists' working premise is that the GA IT-WfO system 
is an obstacle to environmental protection. Short of a no-growth economic 
stance, this is a false premise. The GAIT-WfO system and free trade are not 
environmental villains. As explained by one economist, "[e]nvironmental 
problems arise from various types of market (prices not reflecting environmental 
costs) and government failure (subsidies to polluting activities) or lack of clear 
property rights."S-I In other words, ifWfO disciplines were honored less in the 
breach and more in the observance, then the GATI-WfO system would be at 
least a partial solution to the world pollution problem. By opening markets and 
lifting government restrictions on trade as GAIT directs, wealth will be 
generated, and wealth can be used to clean the environment. In the words of one 
commentator, "[i]f trade were responsible for environmental degradation, then 
presumably those countries that trade the least, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, 
would have the best environments. We know that is not the case."S5 . 
In short, unilateralism that is extraterritorial in nature is not only illegal in the 
trade-environment context, but it is also bad policy. Unilateral import bans can 
be a "feel good" response to an environmental threat, but the real measure of 
their worth should be their effectiveness. Symbolic gestures can be morally 
important and spiritually uplifting, but if they do not promote meaningful, lasting 
change, then they are not worth the candle. A bilateral/multilateral approach to 
resolving environmental issues provides greater assurance that import bans 
ostensibly for environmental protection are truly for the purpose of 
The Gmllilll, ojProledionirm, S1IjJra note 73, at 25. 
83. Set David Vogel, DisatS.fol/J'.f C01l1111ellt.r, ill TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, S1IjJra note 
15, at 245; .fel also Todd Wilkinson, ElIvirolllJlllltalisl.f Discover a ClIriOIl.f AIfy, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Dec. 13, 1999, at 3. 
84. Sorsa, S1IjJra note 70, at 325 n.3. 
85. Marino Marcich, Trade OIId EllvirollJllt1lt: What Conjlia?, 31 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 917, 
920 (2000). 
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environmental protection, and not a pretext for trade protectionism. Moreover, 
unilateral import bans that address environmental issues rarely attack the root of 
a problem (e.g., banning the importation of goods produced by polluting 
production processes and methods usually will not stop the polluting production 
processes and methods). If the goal is to have durable and robust global 
environmental protection, then multilateral approaches are the obvious 
alternative to unilateral initiatives in the fonn of import bans. Unilateralism will 
meet with resistance, defiance, or, at best, begrudging acquiescence with chiseling 
at every turn. If a country heads down the unilateralism road, then other 
countries are free to do the same. A downward spiral could result, with everyone 
the loser, including the environment. 
V. OTHER IMAGINED wro FAILURES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
A. Transparenry and Democrary: WTO Relations with Civil SocieEY 
Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the environmental 
community complain that the work of the wro and the CTE is closed to 
them.86 The United States has pressed for making the work of the wro and 
CTE, in general, more open and transparent to the public. In this connection, 
in July 1996, the wro General Council adopted a decision, Guidelines for 
Arrangements on Relations with Non-GovernmentaIO'l.ani:(fltions.87 Recognizing the 
important contribution that NGOs can make in increasing public awareness 
regarding its activities, the wro agreed to improve transparency and to develop 
better lines of communication with NGOs in several respects. First, the wro 
agreed to derestrict documents more promptly than in the past and to make them 
available on the WIO's on-line computer network. 88 Second, direct contacts 
with NGOs by the wro Secretariat through symposia are also encouraged. 
Beginning in May 1997, the wro Secretariat has organized a series of symposia 
with NGOs on trade, environment, and sustainable development.89 Another 
86. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Parti&ipotioll ofNollgovmllJltntaIO'l,ani:(J1tioltS ill the World TraM 
O'l,anizatioll, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EeON. L 331 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Participation of 
NonGoVtf7ll1ltlttal Partits in the Woml TraM O'l,alliza/ioll-Exttltsion of SIPlldillg in WorM TraM 
O'l,ani:(J1tioll DispH/es 10 NOlllflVtf7ll1ltltt Parties, 17 U. PA.J. INT'LEeoN.L 295 (1996). 
87. The text of the decision can be found in TraM alld Ellvirultl1ltltt N,ws BHUttin No. 16, 
GHidtlillts for Am11lgel1ltltt.r or &1o/ioltS 1vi/h NOII-GoVtf7ll1ltltIP/O'l,anizatioltS, TE/016 (Nov. 28, 1999), 
availobl, at http://www.wto.org. 
88. Formal procedures for the circulation and derestriction of wro documents were 
adopted by the General Council on July 18, 1996. Set PrulttiHrts for the Ciro/Iotioll and Dmslrictioll of 
Iln"O DOCHl1ItIt/s, wr /L/l60/Rev.l (1996), availob/t at http://www.wto.org/wto/Trade+ Env / 
te016.htm. 
89. For a summary of the proceedings, see 1!9TO SympOsiHI1I 011 TraM, Envirulll1ltltt and 
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high-level symposium on trade and environment was organized by the Secretariat 
in March 1999.91' Third, observer status at C1E meetings has been extended to 
the Secretariats of CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, the 
Framework Convention on Biological Diversity, and other international 
environmental organizations. 
The wro Secretariat periodically has held formal and informal meetings with 
NGOs concerned with matters relating to the wro's work on trade, the 
environment, and sustainable development. Several of such meetings were held 
in 1995 and 1996.91 Many participants expressed disappointment with the 
wro's Guidelines to the extent they fall short of the NGOs' goal of complete 
wro transparency and public accountability. Of special concern was the lack 
of access for NGOs to wro meetings and the number of documents that did 
not have to be derestricted for up to six months. NGOs did, however, applaud 
the wro's creation of the publication, Trade and Environment Bulletin, as a useful 
step toward increased transparency and improved dialogue. 
Whether and how to accommodate the desires of NGOs for greater 
participation in the work of the wro remains an unresolved issue, at least for 
N GOs. The wro must resolve to what extent, if any, should NGOs participate 
in the policy work of the wro and its committees. Also, the wro must 
determine to what extent, if any, should NGOs participate in the wro dispute 
settlement process, either as parties, intervenors, amicus curiae, witnesses, or 
observers.92 
If the model for greater NGO participation in the policy work of the wro 
is the role played by NGOs in other international organizations, such as the 
United Nations, the International Labor Organization, or CITES, then NGOs 
have a valid argument for increased participation in that facet of the wro's 
work. Also, NGOs insist on participatory rights in the wro dispute setdement 
process, even to the point of having standing to initiate dispute setdement 
proceedings as complaining parties. Currendy, NGOs have no right to 
participate formally in wro dispute setdement proceedings. Being able to 
provide wro panelists with additional information could hardly be a bad thing, 
if fully informed decision making is the desideratum. NGO participation in the 
Sustainable Development, Press/TE/019 (Aug. 14,1997). 
90. See WTO, High LevelSymposiHm on Trade am/Enviro1llllent, Backl,roHnd Note from the Seentariat 
(Mar. 1999); wro Press Release, WTO High-Lniel Symposia on Trade and Environment a"d T radt and 
Development, Press/123 (Mar. 1, 1999); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United StaltS Trade 
Rrpresentative Charlene Barsheftk:! Appkmds WTO Trade and Enviro"ment Con/mner, Press Release 99-25 
(Mar. 17,1999). 
91. See REPORT (1996) OF THE COMMI1TEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, 
wr/CTE/W40 (Nov. 12,1996) 1 3. 
92. See Charnovitz, s1pra note 86, at 340; see airo Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: AI/olvi"g 
Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute RtSomlion System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 
(1997). 
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wro dispute settlement process as amicus Cflriae could prove useful. However, 
permitting NGO participation at the party or intervenor level could only have the 
effect of burdening an ever-growing wro docket, delaying the dispute 
settlement process and worse, creating disenchantment with that process among 
its intended users, wro members. Recalling that one of the major complaints 
about GA Tf 1947 was the impotence ofits dispute settlement process, avoiding 
the mistakes of the past is critical to the future success of the wro DSU. Thus, 
the argument for direct NGO participation in the wro dispute setdement 
process is, on balance, not especially compelling. 
In the wro panel proceeding, Regime for th~ Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Banana.r,93 lawyers representing private parties attempted to attend the panel 
meetings but were excluded. Consistent with GAIT practice and wro dispute 
settlement proceedings, only representatives of governments may attend panel 
meetings.94 Because private lawyers are not subject to DSU disciplinary rules, 
their presence in panel meetings could give rise to concerns about breaches of 
confidentiality. 
Although private parties representing private interests have no right to 
participate direcdy in wro panel proceedings, in the Shrimp/Turtle Ca.re, several 
environmental NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus briefs with the panel 
defending the u.s. import ban. The panel concluded that under Article 13.2 of 
the DSU, only information that the panel seek.r (i.e., actually solicits) may be 
considered by a panel. Nevertheless, the panel invited the United States, if it so 
desired, to include the NGO submissions as part of its own submission.95 The 
Appellate Body affirmed the panel's decision to permit the United States to 
include the NGO submissions as part of its own submission, but reversed the 
panel's other conclusion, holding that a panel is free to accept unsolicited 
submissions from interested groups if such information would be helpful to the 
panel in reaching its decision.96 In connection with the NGO submissions, the 
Appellate Body found that the panel's reading of Article 13.2 of the DSU was too 
narrow. 
We find, and so hold, that the Panel eued in its legal intetpretation that accepting 
non-requested infonnation from non-governmental sources is incompatible with 
the provisions of the DSU. At the same time, we consider that the Panel acted 
within the scope of its authority under Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU in allowing 
93. wro Panel Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Djgtribution of Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, wr /DS27/R/USA, 
wr /DS27/R/ECU, wr /DS27/R/GTM, wr /DS27/R/HND, Wr/DS27/R/MEX (May 22, 
1997) [hereinafter Regime for the Importation ofBanana.~I. 
94. Stt id., at 290, '1[7.11. Seegmtm/fy Schleyer, JlljJmnote 92, at 2275. 
95. Sit Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, JlljJm note 9,17.8. 
96. See id., at 39,1110. 
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any party to the dispute to attach the briefs by non-govemmental organizations, 
or any portion thereof, to its own submissions.97 
The Appellate Body thus concluded that a panel is free to accept unsolicited 
submissions from interested groups if such information would be helpful to the 
panel in reaching its decision. A panel does not have the power to disregard a 
private-party submission solely because it was not submitted by a disputing wro 
member.98 The panel in European Communities-Measures AffectingAsbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products,99 received amicus mtiaesubmissions from four 
private sources. Two of those amims submissions were appended to the EU's 
submissions to the panel, which the panel in turn accepted. IIlO It declined to 
consider the other two amims submissions that were not included in any of the 
disputing members' submissions.lol 
In short, the wro has an image problem, especially on environmental issues. 
It is viewed by most environmental groups as secretive and closed. Meaningfully 
increasing the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society in the 
discussions will improve the wro's legitimacy, increase trust, polish its tarnished 
image, and reduce the wro's so-called "democracy deficit."to2 The participation 
ofNGOs in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute via the u.s. submissions was a small step 
in the right direction. At the same time, however, the wro must guard against 
the risk that isolationist NGOs want to hijack the wro and use it for their own 
purposes, none of which coincide with the mission and objectives of the wrO. 
B. Rejection of a Precautionary Principle As Some Would Have It: Whither CMOs? 
Following consumer concerns over the safety of hormone-fed beef, in 1987 
the EC imposed a ban on imports of animals and meat from animals fed six 
specific growth-promoting hormones.lo3 The United States objected to this ban 
97. See Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report. supra note 9, at 39, ,. 110. 
98. See generalfJ Michael Laidhold, Private PaT!! Access to the WTO: Do fuctnt Developments in 
Tntemational Trade Dispute &solution &alfJ Give Private Organi~tions a Voict in the IPTa?, 12 
TRANSNATLLAW. 427,441 (1999). 
99. wro Panel Report on European Communities--Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, Wl'/DS135/R (Sept 18,2000), at WfO Website, supra note 9. 
1 00. See itI. 
101. See itI. at 399, '118.13. Amicus submissions were also made in United States-Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolleduad and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United 
Kingdom. See WTO Appellate Body on United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT /DS/138/ AB/R, " 40-42 (adopted June 7, 2000), atWfO Website, supra note 9. 
102. See Laidhold, supra note 98, at 442. See generalfJ Daniel Bodansky, The ugitimafJ of 
IntemationalGovemanct:A Coming Challenge for Intemational Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 596 
(1999). 
103. For additional background on the dispute, see Kristin Mueller, H0171l0nal Imbalallct: An 
AnalYsis of the H0171l0ne T~ated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the ElIropean Union, 1 
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on the ground that the six hormones had been found safe for use in growth 
promotion by every country that has examined them. Canada brought a nearly 
identical complaint against the EC. Furthermore, not only did the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) review five of the six hormones and find 
them to be safe, but the EC itsdf twice commissioned experts to review the same 
five hormones, and on both occasions the experts found the hormones to be 
safe.1M Three of the hormones are naturally occurring in animals and humans; 
the other three are artificially produced. The EC defended its measures in part 
on the ground that they were based on the "precautionary principle," i.e., that as 
long as there is some scientific basis for adopting a particular SPS measure, that 
such measure should pass muster under the SPS Agreement. 
In the Hormone Beif dispute, the Appellate Body agreed that the precautionary 
principle, as reflected in Articles 3.3 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, lOS declined 
DRAKll J. AGRIC. L. 97 (1996); AlI('"fl Dick, The BC Hormotre Botr DiJpllte otrd the Applicotiotr of the 
Displlte S ellltlllttrt ProvlriOI1J of the Stomlords Code, 10 MICH. J. INT'LL 872 (1989); Office of the USTR, 
WTO HormotrtS RrportCotrjirms U.s. Witr, Press Release 97-76, Aug. 18,1997; David A. Wlrth, The 
Role of S attrct itr the UT7Il,IIf!J Rolltrd otrd NAFrA Trade Disciplitres, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 817 (1994). 
104. See wro Appellate Body Report on European Communities-EC Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Wf /DS26/ AB/R, Wf /DS48/ AB/R, at 6-8, 11, mI 2.17-
2.25,2.33 (1998) [hereinafter Hormone Beef), olWfO Webh-ite, mpranote 9. 
105. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, wro Agreement, 
Annex 1 A, LEGAL TEXTS, sll/Jra note 22, at 59 [hereinafter SPS Agreement). In tandem, Articles 
3.3 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement reflect the WfO's version of the precautionary principle. Article 
3.3 provides: 
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary orphytosanitary measures which 
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be 
achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines 
or recomm('"fldations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence 
of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be 
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 
through 8 of Article 5. (2) Notwithstanding the above, all measures which 
result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that 
which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other 
provision of this Agreement 
Id. art 3.3. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific 
justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available 
scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve it~ appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 
Itf. art 3.3 n.2. 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement in tum provides: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
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to state whether it was part of customary intemationallaw, and agreed with the 
panel that whatever its status, the precautionary principle does not override the 
provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement dealing with risk 
assessment.1M Although the precautionary principle is reflected in Articles 3.3 
and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, it can only be invoked when scientific evidence 
is "insufficient." All the available scientific evidence pointed to the conclusion 
that the hormones in dispute are safe when used in conformity with good 
practice. The precautionary principle does not override the express provisions 
of Articles 2 and 5 of the SPS Agreement requiring that SPS measures be based 
on scientific evidence and a risk assessment. In this case, the EU had failed to 
carry out a proper risk assessment, so that reliance on the precautionary principle 
was misplaced. 107 
Consumer and environmental concerns have also been raised over the safety 
of genetically-modified crops for humans and animals. The lesson of the 
Hormone Bey dispute for the GMO controversy is that to the extent that relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient to show that genetically-modified organisms 
(GMOs) pose no health risk to humans, animals, and plants, importing countries 
may on a temporary basis exclude such products after conducting a risk 
assessment (i.e., an evaluation that GMOs are a potential source of adverse 
effects on human or animal health). There exists some scientific evidence that 
indicates that certain GMOs pose just such a threat to animal life, 10K although in 
September 2000, the EU Scientific Committee found no scientific basis for an 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basi.~ of 
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international 
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and 
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time. 
SPS Agreement, mpra art. 5.7; see also James F. Smith, From Franlunflod to FT7Iit FlitS: NtWigaling the 
WTO/SPS,6 u.c. DAVISJ.INT'LL & PoL'Y 1 (2000). 
106. See Hormone Beef, slI/Jra note 104, at 46-47, Ti 123-25. 
107. Japan met with a similar fate in its attempt to justify quarantine measures on imported 
fruits and nuts by relying on the precautionary principle. See wro Appellate Body Report on 
Japan- Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Wf/DS76/ AB/R, 'd'\I81-82 (Feb. 22, 1999), 
at wro Website, slI/Jra note 9. See gtneral!! Steve Chamovitz, The SlI/JmJision ofHtallh and BiosqfrtJ 
&gllloliolll!J World Trade RNkr, 13 TuL. ENV1L. LJ. 271 (2000). 
108. SeeToshio Aritake,Jt1jJ111I Bllads LobelingStandardsforPromstdAgriCIIllllmlProdllds, 16 Int'I 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 29, at 1216 Quly 21, 1999); BCFne:(!SApprovalofU.s. GMO SttdFollo1Villg 
Report ofHt1T1II to Blltttif/itS, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 886 (May 26,1999). Fora study 
of the issues surrounding the safety of GMOs, Stt OECD, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE FOR THE 
SAFETY OF NOVEL FOODS AND FEEDS, C(2000) 86/ ADD1 (May 2000). 
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Italian government ban on seven GM food products.I09 Other GM products 
appear to pose no health risk.IID 
What importing countries do with this science--riskmanagement-is the next 
question. If they impose an import ban, it will be up to the United States and 
Canada, the chief producers of GM crops, to muster sufficient scientific evidence 
to show that exported products containing GMOs are safe. 111 If they are unable 
to do so, then under the Article 5.7 precautionary principle importing countries 
may exclude their importation, provided they continue to gather additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of riskwithin a reasonable 
period of time. 
In the absence of sufficient scientific evidence to show that exported products 
containing GMOs are either safe or unsafe, can importing countries insist that 
products containing GMOs be labeled as such? Opponents oflabeling insist that 
the answer is "no," unless it can be shown that GMOs pose a health risk, 
pointing to Article 2.2 of the wro Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
that labeling would fulfill a legitimate government objective only if GMO 
products are a human health or safety risk.1I2 In Europe, a survey conducted in 
1999 revealed that 86 percent of those surveyed want products containing GMOs 
to be labeled as such. Consumer surveys in the United States, on the other hand, 
give mixed views on the desire for labeling, perhaps reflecting a more relaxed 
attitude toward food than that of Europeans. I 13 
In January 2000, 135 countries concluded a biosafety protocol to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Under the Cartagena Protocol, 114 importing 
109. See Joe Kirwin, BU Pone/Finds No Saentific Bam For Bon on Corn Rapeseed Prodllcts, 17 Int'I 
Trade Rep. (DNA), No. 37, at 1441 (Sept. 21, 2000); Eric]. Lyman,ItafyPlons /0 Uphold Bon on FOllr 
TypuOfGM Corn DespileBURRling, OjJidoltSt!J,17 Int'I Trade Rep. (DNA),No. 37,at 1442 (Sept. 
21,2000). 
110. See BU Samtists OK Food Prodllcl.t Derived from Genetkolfy Modijied Tomato Seeds, 16 Int'I 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 40, at 1660 (Oct. 13, 1999). Bllt set Susan Ladika,AH.rtrio Bans GM Corn, 
Cilint, Lock of Sflldies 011 Its Bmironmento/ Impact, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (DNA), No. 16, at 620 (Apr. 20, 
2000). 
111. See Conodion Minister Dismisses A.IItt,oIions That Genetica/fJ Modijied Foods A" Unsoft, 16 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 42, at 1762 (Oct. 27,1999); U.S., Conodo Lodge Complaints Over RopidRire 
in Genetic LobelingMeOSllTU, 16 lnt'! Trade Rep. (DNA), No. 24, at 1006 Oune 16, 1999). 
112. See genera/fJ Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter Technical Barriers to Tradel, 
art. 2.2. wro Agreement, Annex lA, LEGAL TExTs, s1ljJro note 22, at 1. 
113. See Sticky Lobtlt, THE EcONOMI5f, May 1,1999, at 75. 
114. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Global Treaty Adopted on Genetically Modified 
Organisms, Press Relea.~e,Jan. 29,2000, fJ1HJiloble o/http://www.biodiv.org.As of June 1,2000,67 
countries and the EU had signed the Protocol. See Eric]. Lyman, Sixty·Seven Notions, BU Sign 
Protocol on Biosf!ftty 10 U.N. T"oty on Biodiversity, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 22, at 861 Oune 1, 
2000). For a critique of the Cartagena Protocol, see Jonathan H. Adler, Mo" Sony Than Sf!ft: 
Assessing lhe P"calltionmy Prindpk OTld the Proposed Internotiona/Biosf!ft!Y Protocol, 35 TEX. IN1~L L.J. 173 
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countries have the right to block imports of live GMOs if there is a reasonable 
doubt whether they could endanger public health or the environment. The 
Protocol is limited to living modified organisms, excluding processed foods, 
feeds, and commodities. Therefore, the impact of the Protocol is muted. 
Further muting the impact of the Protocol is its preamble, which provides that 
the Protocol shall not be interpreted as changing the rights and obligations of 
countries under other international agreements. 
Just over a year ago, in November 1999, the United States and the EU 
discussed the formation of an ad hoc scientific panel to resolve GMO issues.115 
In June, 2000, the two parties agreed to continue government-to-government 
talks aimed at improving market access for U.S. biotechnology products by 
establishing the U.S.-EU Biotechnology Consultative Forum.116 The Consultative 
Forum is expected to finalize a report that will address issues such as health, 
safety, economic development, food security, and the environment by the end of 
2000.117 
In the meantime, the EU extended its de facto ban on the approval of any new 
GMOs through the end of the year. I IS Biotech companies have extended an olive 
branch, offering, interalia, to label on a voluntary basis all GM products through 
all processing stages.119 Canada has proposed that a voluntary standard for 
labeling foods derived from biotechnology be developed.120 The Codex 
Committee on Food Labeling will complete work on labeling proposals for food 
derived from biotechnology in 2001.121 The United States supports a proposal 
that would require food derived from biotechnology to be labeled if the altered 
food or ingredients differs from the Original.l22 South Korea, on the other hand, 
has issued guidelines for the mandatory labeling for crops and foodstuffs 
(2000). 
115. See Mark Felsenthal & Corbett B. Daly, Clinton, Prom Vow to Ease WTO Di,ffirtnctI, Create 
TemporaryScientiftc Pane/on GMOs, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 1776 (Nov. 3, 1999); US., 
EU to Belin Ta/ksAimed atSettling Row Over EU Ban on GMO Imports, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 
45, at 1862 (Nov. 17,1999). 
116. Set Gary G. Yerkey, US., EU Agrte to Pllrslle High-Lew/Ta/ks on Biotech Tradlt1s New Group 
Is Set Up, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 23, at 886 Oune 8,2000). 
117. See Kirwin, supra note 109, at 1441. 
118. Set Joseph Kirwin, EU's Ban on ProMm Containing GMOs WiURemain in P/actforat Least 
Six Months, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 431 (Mar. 16,2000). 
119. Set Biotech Companies Propose to EU Meas/lTtS Aimed at Fears ojGMO ProMets, 16 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 1775 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
120. Set wro Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Communication from Canada, The 
Dewlopmenl of a Volllntary Standard for the Labdling of Foods Derivtd from Biotechnology, G /TBT /W /134 
(May 23, 2000); FoodFight, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1999, at 22-
121. See Peter Menyasz, Codex Commtteeon FoodLabeling to Spend Year Dewloping GMO Proposals, 
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 827 (May 25, 2000). 
122. See it! 
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containing GMOs effective March 2001.123 Australia and New Zealand have also 
adopted a measure calling for mandatory labeling of GM foods beginning in 
September 2001.124 U.S. farmers for their part do not want any U.S.-EU 
negotiations to drag on indefinitely.l25 Japan has proposed the creation of a 
forum in connection with the wro agricultural negotiations that began January 
2000, to address the issue of GMOS.I26 The United States has urged wro 
members to participate in the work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission to 
advance agreement on relevant international standards for GMOS.l27 
Interestingly, the United States has refrained from initiating wro dispute 
settlement panel proceedings over the GMO issue. Bearing in mind that the 
United States has not been shy in the past in using the wro dispute settlement 
mechanism to resolve trade disputes that some might consider trivial (e.g., the 
complaint filed in the Bananas Case), the United States' hesitancy in demanding 
that a wro panel be established suggests at least three things: (1) there is 
insufficient clarity in the SPS Agreement to ensure a U.S. victory;l28 (2) the 
United States understands that the GMO controversy is highly politically charged 
in the EU;l29 and (3) the United States realizes that the only way to ensure a 
favorable outcome in the GMO controversy is to proceed multilaterally. Despite 
U.S. reluctance to initiate dispute settlement proceedings, Thailand and Egypt 
were locked in a GMO dispute in September 2000 over an Egyptian ban on 
123. Set James Lim, SOllth KoTta Finaliifs Gllitklints for Labeling GMOs Stortinl,Next Year, 17 lnt'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 18, at 710 (May 4, 2000). 
124. See AIISlrolia, NtIII Zealond Health Ministers AtWpt Pion for Labeling of GMO Foods, 17 Inri 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 32, at 1242 (Aug. 10,2000). 
125. See Gary G. Yerkey, FOf'11I Leatkr U1l,ts U.s. to Establish Six-Month Deadline for Biotech Pact 
with EU, 16 Inri Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 46, at 1904 (Nov. 24, 1999). 
126. See genero/fJ ProposalofJopan on Genelica/fJ Modified 01l,anisms (GMOs), l'reparation for the 
1999 Ministerial Conference, wr / GC/W /365 (Oct. 13, 1999). 
127. See wro, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Submission from the United States, 
GmeticalIY Modified AgriCIIlturoi and Food Prod lids, G /TBT /W /115 (June 17, 1999). 
128. See Yerkey, mpronote 125, at 1905 reporting that 
lsi Siddiqui, special assistant to the secretary of agriculture for international 
affairs, said ... that, if the U.S.-EU discussions were to fail, the United States 
would be prepared to seek clarification of existing wro rules to ensure that 
national import approval procedures for bioengineered products were 
transparent, science-based, and predictable. 
Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU to Be!ln Talks Aimed at Sellling Rolli Over EU Ban on GMO Imports, 16 Inri 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 45, at 1862 (Nov. 17, 1999)(reporting that "Senior U.S. officials said ... that 
the United States was prepared to bring the issue into the wro negotiating process if it cannot be 
settled on a bilateral basis"). 
129. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sqys Media, Privall Gro1ljJs'Stirring Up Anli-GMO Climatein 
Ellrope, 17 lnt'! Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 16, at 621 (Apr. 20, 2000); Daniel Pruzin, Thailond Seeks 
Talks with Egypt on TlinaBanin GMO Dispute, 17 Inri Trade Rep. (BNA). No. 16, at 1472 (Sept. 28, 
2000). 
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imports of Thai canned tuna packed in oil made from GM beans. Thailand has 
requested consultations with Egypt under the DSU over the import ban.l30 
On a related front, many countries have adopted or are considering adopting 
labeling requirements for all foods containing GMOs. Beginning in May 2000, 
the Codex Committee on Food Labeling is expected to spend a year working on 
labeling proposals for foods derived from GMOs.l3l Canada has urged the 
adoption of a voluntary standard for labeling of foods derived from GMOs in an 
effort to derail the drive for mandatory labeling.132 Other countries are moving 
forward, however, with mandatory labeling requirements.133 In response to a 
proposed EU regulation requiring that all products containing GMOs be labeled 
for the benefit of consumers, the United States has objected that unless such 
labeling requirements are science-based, they are invalid under either the SPS 
Agreement or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. l34 Yet, even as the 
United States was objecting to GMO labeling requirements proposed by its 
trading partners, a bill entided, ccGenetically Engineered Food Right to Know 
Act," was introduced in Congress in November 1999.135 
Finally, it is ironic that environmental groups are among the most vocal 
opponents of GMOs when it is indisputable that the cultivation of GM crops has 
direct and substantial benefits for the environment.136 GM com and soybeans, 
for example, are designed to be drought, disease, weed, and pest resistant, 
meaning that fewer chemical pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides have to be 
applied to control pests, diseases, and weeds, and less water .has to be used to 
irrigate GM cropS.137 
In sum, the latest trade-environment dispute involving GMOs suggests that 
the SPS Agreement should be revised to more carefully articulate what the 
precautionary principle is. Articles 3.3 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement refer 
vaguely to it, but, as the wro dispute setdement decision in the Hormone Beef 
dispute makes apparent, clarification is needed. Against the backdrop of a 
communication from the EU in March 2000 on the precautionary principle and 
130. See Pruzin, s1pranote 129, at 1472. 
131. See Menyasz,.rrpm note 121, at 827. See a/;o SlkJ:J Laht/;, slIjJmnote 113, at 75. 
132. See wro Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, slI/Jmnote 120. 
133. See, e.g., Lim, s1pranote 123, at 710;JapanAgenfJ 10 fuqllirt GMO Saft!Y, AlIugy Lahtling on 
FooM in Apri12001, 17 Inri Trade Rep. (BNA), No.8, at 295 (Feb. 24, 2000). 
134. Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides in part: "technical 
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective .... 
Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, .•• protection of human health or safety, animal or plant 
life or health, or the environment" Technical Barriers to Trade, s1pm note 112, art. 2.2 
135. See Bill Seeking Labelin& Mort fusearch on GeneJi((J/fy Altered Foods Expected Soon, 16 Inri 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 45, at 1877 (Nov. 17,1999). 
136. See Alexandra Marks, U.S. PoiJtd for a Biotech FoodFighl, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 
17,1999,at4. 
137. See itI. 
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on guidelines for applying it, 138 the United States and the EU a month later 
agreed to continue discussions over the course of the coming year on conflicting 
definitions and applications of the precautionary principle to food safety under 
Codex auspices.139 The 1992 Rio Declaration states that "[w]here there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation."I.w Whether it will be possible to improve upon this 
articulation of the precautionary principle remains to be seen. 
In addition, risk analysis has three components: risk assessment, risk 
management, and risk communication. The role of risk communication needs 
to be elaborated, especially in connection with labeling of products containing 
GMOs to address consumer concerns about the safety of such products. 
VI. MULTILATERALISM PROTECTS THE INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 
A threshold observation is that developing and developed countries appear to 
be working at cross purposes in setting environmental priorities. Developing 
countries are focused on water, housing, and poverty reduction; and developed 
countries are focused on ozone depletion, biodiversity, deforestation, and 
desertification.I-I1 
Two important points should be made in connection with the impact of the 
trade-environment debate on devdoping countries. First, in connection with 
wro dispute settlement, recall that the complaining parties in the Tuna/Dolphin 
and Shrimp/Turtle disputes were Mexico, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, all developing countries. In another wro trade-environment dispute 
involving EPA clean air regulations, United States - Standards for &formulated 
Gasoline and Conventional Gasolinem-the first dispute to be resolved under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding-the complaining countries were Venezuela 
and Brazil. In each of those cases, developing countries defeated the most 
powerful country in the world through the rule of law. In order for global 
138. See wro , Committee on Sanitaryand Phytosanitary Measures, Communication from the 
European Communities, CommNmmtion from the Commission Olf the PncoHtionory Principle, 
G/SPS/GEN/168 (Mar. 14,2000). 
139. See U.S., ENropeOIlS Pledge /0 COlf/inNe Work onAppllin!, PnCtlNtionory Principle, 17 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), No. 16, at 619 (Apr. 20,2000). 
140. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,June 14, 1992, principle 15, U.N. 
Doe. A/CONF. 151/5 (1992) nprinttd in 31 J.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). 
141. S tt Robert M. Press,A Year After Rio, North ondSoNth StiUDebote Priorities, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 3. 
142 Stt wro Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated Gasoline and 
Conventional Gasoline, wr /DS2/R Gan. 29, 1996), ot wro Website, slljJra note 9. 
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governance to be stable and predictable, a rules-based, not power-based, legal 
regime is required. The wro fulfills this requirement. 
Envirorunentalists ask rhetorically, '<Who needs the wrO?" Among the 
immediate beneficiaries of a rules-based regime are developing countries when 
they make a legal challenge against a developed country. The experience of 
developing countries in wro dispute settlement has generally been a good one. 
In addition to the Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Turtle and Reformulated Gasoline disputes, 
in the Bananas dispute tiny Ecuador was authorized to cross-sector retaliate in the 
services and intellectual property sectors against the EU, a wro first. W None 
of these results would have been possible in a power-based regime. I+! 
Second, although most people are deeply troubled that dolphins and sea turtles 
are killed in the process of harvesting tuna and shrimp, had the Tuna/Dolphin and 
Shrimp/Turtle disputes been resolved ultimately in favor of the United States, the 
ability of poor people in developing countries to earn a livelihood would have 
been damaged. The action of the United States in those cases smacks of "eco-
imperialism," i.e., demanding that developing countries either adopt excessively 
stringent, costly, and arguably inappropriate environmental standards that are 
based on developed-country value judgments or run the risk of import bans on 
shipments of goods to developed countries. One wonders if in the end it would 
not have been cheaper--and more enlightening-to give the shrimpers the 
TEDs that the United States demanded they use. In a conversation I had with 
delegates at the Thai embassy in Washington at the end of September, I learned 
Thailand has had a sea turtle protection program on one of its islands, which 
serves as a sea turtle sanctuary. I also learned that a single TED costs about 
$1,000, and that the Thai shrimper fleet consists of approximately 500 vessels. 
It seems that between the U.S. Agency for International Development and 
concerned envirorunental groups, $500,000 could have been scraped together to 
pay for the TEDs. Is it not better to light a candle than curse the darkness? 
Third, apparently forgotten in the debate over the safety of GMOs is the fact 
that developing countries are the prime beneficiaries of the green revolution. 
Biotechnology and GM crops offer the potential for increasing both the yield and 
the nutritional value of food cropS.145 An estimated 800 million people are 
malnourished, the overwhelming majority of whom live in developing countries. 
Fear mongers who raise the specter of "Frankenfoods" and proponents of a 
precautionary principle that is not science-based should bear this grim fact in 
mind. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he truly fatal flaw of the precautionary 
principle, ignored by almost all the commentators, is the unsupported 
presumption that an action aimed at public health protection cannot possibly 
143. See Pruzin, sstpra note 62, at 832. 
144. See Rita M. Wistoff-Ito, The UnitedStates and Shrimp Import Prohibitions: Refnsing to Snmnikr 
the American Go/iolh Role in Conservation, 23 MD.]. INT'LL. & TRADE 247, 289 (1999). 
145. See Adler, sstpra note 114, at 200. 
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have negative effects on public health.,,146 In other words, there also are risks 
associated with maintaining the status quo. By focusing on just the risks that 
concern changing the status quo, the precautionary principle ignores the harm 
that will occur or that is exacerbated by putting the brakes on technological 
development.147 
VII. SOME MODEST-AND WILD-EVEn-PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Lest I leave the reader with the impression that all is well at the wro or that 
I am a rabid wro apologist, let me propose eight reforms that the wro 
membership should consider in the trade-environment area. First, bridging the 
trade-environment gap may require a fresh look at wro agreements, in 
particular GAIT Article XX and the SPS Agreement The SPS Agreement 
and/ or GA'IT Article XX could be amended to clarify the status of multilateral 
environmental agreements, namely, in the event of a conflict, which prevails?148 
NAFfA Article 104 is a possible model. It provides that in the event of an 
inconsistency between NAFfA and one of three multilateral environmental 
agreements (i.e., the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 
the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, and 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer), the latter 
prevails. To date, no dispute involving a multilateral environmental agreement 
has arisen in the wrO.149 However, in the view of the United States, an 
amendment ofwrO rules may be unnecessary in order for wro members to 
cnter into Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) authorizing the 
imposition of trade measures in the event there is a violation of the MEA.ISO 
Nevertheless, wro panel and Appellate Body reports determine the legal rights 
of the members who are parties to the dispute. They do not lay down a general 
rule on the relationship between GA'IT 1994 and MEAs. Accordingly, clarifying 
the situation by (1) amending GA'IT Article xx, (2) having the General Council 
issue an interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing 
the WTO, lSI or (3) amending Article V of the Agreement Establishing the wro 
146. Frank B. Cross, Porodoxicol Perils of the Pncolilionaty Principk, 53 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 851, 
859-60 (1996). 
147. SeeAdler,stpmnote 114,at195. 
148. Stt wro, Committee on Trade and Environment, Submission by Switzerland, The 
RelolionshipbetweentheProvisionsoftheMNllilolemlTmdingSysttlllondMllllilotemlEnvironmentolAgmments 
(MEAs), wr /CfE/W /139 Oune 8, 2000). 
149. Set it!. 
150. Set Rossella Brevetti, WTO fulks Allow Porties 10 Join Pods on Globol Environment IVith T mde 
Provisions, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 446 (Mar. 16,2000). 
151. An interpretation from the General Council requires a three-fourths majority vote of the 
wro members. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization stpmnote 
22, at art. IX 2. 
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to establish the relationship of the wro with MEAs might be an appropriate 
step to take. 
Second, the precautionary principle as it currently stands in the SPS 
Agreement has not been a viable defense in wro dispute settlement 
proceedings. The Appellate Body, although somewhat delphic in its 
pronouncements on this score, has signaled that the SPS Agreement will have to 
be amended ifwrO members want to raise the precautionary principle as a legal 
defense in wro dispute settlement. A number of environmental groups and the 
EU have advocated amending the SPS Agreement to permit reliance on a version 
of the precautionary principle that states, in essence, ''better safe than sorry."IS2 
In the context of GMOs, however, any revised or clarified version of the 
precautionary principle must also require that risk assessments take into account 
the downside risks of not adopting new technologies. In other words, risk 
assessments must take into account the importance of GMOs to agricultural 
productivity, to the millions of malnourished people in developing countries, to 
habitat conservation, and to reducing the use of pesticides and fertilizers that 
pollute the watershed. Whatever the outcome, a precautionary principle that is 
based on clear guidelines should be included in the SPS Agreement. IS3 
The SPS Agreement should also be expanded to include animal welfare issues. 
In a decision that should bring this proposal to the fore, the EU banned the 
hormone, Bovine Somatotropin (BS1), which enhances milk production in dairy 
cows, on October 26, 1999, on the ground that such a ban would promote animal 
health and welfare. 154 On a smaller but voluntary scale, McDonald's now requires 
that farmers who supply it with eggs adopt humane methods of raising hens. ISS 
Third, as part of the ongoing negotiations on trade in agricultural products, 
wro members should agree to the elimination of environmentally damaging 
domestic and export subsidies for farming and fishing.156 Such subsidies 
encourage overfishing, overproduction, and excessive use of fertilizers, which 
results in depletion of fish stocks, degradation of the land, and pollution of rivers 
and streams. 
Fourth, the expense alone of bringing a wro complaint can deter a 
developing country from bringing an otherwise meritorious claim against a 
developed country. This cost can also be used by developed countries to harass 
developing countries. In order to strengthen the wro as a forum that is more 
152 See Environmm/al Gro1ljJs U'l.e wro 10A.f/gIV Intport Bans B(/,fed on Pre&'aHlionmy'RNk, 16 Int'l 
Tmde Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 877 (May 26,1999). 
153. See EU Sello Unvtil Plan ~ DtJlISe DispHle IVilh U.S. Over Pre((lHlionaty Principk,' 16 Int'I 
Tmde Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 774 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
154. See Joe Kirwan, EU Proposes PtT711anenl Ban on BST; Expected 10 HtitJ;ten Tensions With U.S., 
16 Int'I Tmde Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 1778 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
155. See Peter C. Choharis, Global FiT7Jfs Need Codes, not UIVsHils, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Sept. 26,2000, at 11. 
156. See Embracing Greenery, sHjJra note 1, at 89. 
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responsive to the financial limitations of its developing-country members, the 
wro Dispute Settlement Understanding should be amended to provide for 
attorney fee shifting, so that the loser pays the winner's attorneys' fees and related 
costs of prosecuting or defending a wro complaint. Alternatively, the wro 
should create the equivalent of a legal aid attorney (or public defender) to 
represent developing countries in wro disputes. This reform could also have 
the salutary effect of reducing the wro dispute settlement caseload, although on 
this point I am less sanguine. 
Fifth, the ability of developing countries to participate in the SPS process 
needs improvement. If and when a developing country is put into the wro 
docket for allegedly violating the SPS Agreement, it will be economically 
hamstrung in meeting the scientific arguments that are an inherent part of such 
disputes. Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement dealing with the appointment of 
experts should be amended by making the appointment of expert advisory panels 
mandatory, by making such expert panels exclusive, and by providing that these 
panels be paid out of the wro's budget. A related reform that could lift some 
of the burden on developing countries in this regard would be to allow NGOs 
with recognized scientific expertise to intervene on behalf of developing 
countries in a DSU panel proceeding. 
Sixth, developed countries made a commitment to provide technical assistance 
to developing countries in Article 9 of the SPS Agreement. There needs to be a 
redoubling of that commitment. In addition, leveraging international standards-
setting bodies is problematic for developing countries because they lack the 
scientific expertise and resources to influence the debate. The commitment that 
developed countries made in Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement to encourage and 
facilitate the participation of developing countries in international standards-
setting organizations has been largely hollow. Coalition building with developed 
countries perhaps offers a better alternative strategy for influencing the debate. 
In that connection, the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries should 
become more active in the international standards-setting process.157 
Seventh, risk analysis has three components: risk assessment, risktnanagement 
(both of which are addressed in the SPS Agreement), and risk communication. 
The role of risk communication needs elaboration, especially in connection with 
labeling to allay consumer concerns about the safety and contents of products. 
If saving turdes is a high value to consumers in developed countries, then 
labeling will empower them so that they can make informed purchasing 
decisions. Again, however, developing countries worry that onerous eco-Iabeling 
requirements could be a disguised form of trade protectionism. Hong Kong and 
157. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, Coinrs Grosp SliD Undtdded Oil HoIV 10 Approach Biotlch IsI1I1 in 
WTO Tolles, 16 Int'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 40 at 1646 (Oct. 13,1999). The Cairns Group 
members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fij~ Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala 
joined as observers in 1999. It!. 
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Egypt have openly complained about inadequate participation in the preparation 
of international eco-Iabeling standards within the International Standards 
Organization. ISS The United States likewise is concerned that eco-Iabeling could 
be a thinly-veiled ruse to exclude GMOs and hormone-treated beef. 
Eighth, environmentalists suffer from DSU envy. The DSU is one of the few, 
if not the only, reasonably effective, non-violent, inter-governmental dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the world. But the wro is about trade, not about the 
environment. It has no claim to expertise, and certainly no claim to legitimacy, 
when it comes to resolving environment disputes. At the risk of sounding like 
a pitch man for AI Gore, the time may be ripe for either establishing a World 
Environment Organization (WEO) or for reinvigorating the United Nations 
Environment Program and have it fulfill a WEO role.ls9 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Multilateralism matters in resolving trade-environment disputes for at least 
three reasons. First, unilateralism is not a legal option under customary 
international law or under conventional law, i.e., GAIT 1994 and the wro 
multilateral trade agreements. GAIT 1994, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, and GAIT panel and wro Appellate Body reports make clear 
that wro members may not apply their environmental laws extraterritorially by 
barring market access to imports originating from other wro members, 
provided such imports do not pose a health or safety risk to humans, animals, or 
plants in the importing member. Second, multilateralism is the best policy option 
when the goal is to protect animals located in the global commons. Unilateral 
approaches, such as a ban on imported goods produced by disfavored production 
processes and methods, rarely, if ever, attack the root of the problem. The lesson 
of the GMO controversy for the United States is that unilateralism is a double-
edged sword. Third, multilateralism, in contrast to unilateralism, is a rules-based, 
not power-based approach to international relations. For weak developing 
countries, a rules-based regime ensures that disputes with developed countries 
will be resolved in a predictable and consistent manner. 
The debacle at the wro's Seattle biennial meeting in December 1999 was in 
part fueled by myths and misinformation about the wro, free trade, and 
globalization. It is true that accelerated trade liberalization worldwide has led to 
the increased globalization of business and the interdependence of national 
economies. Environmental fear mongers proclaim that we are on the brink of 
a global environmental collapse, thanks in large part to free trade. Labor unions 
158. See wro, WTO COlllmillet on Trotk and EnvironmelllAddmses 1#1111 fu/ated to Marlut A«tJI, 
IndNtling Environmental Asselllllenl!, ECO-Labelling, and Iht Environmental Benefil! ofTrode Uberolization 
in A!,riat!IN", Enngy, Fislmiu, Fomtry and Ltathtr, Press/TE 028, at 4-5 (Mar. 31, 1999). 
159. Set Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Hails WTO/UNEP CooperotiOIl 
A!,l'ttlllent, Press Release 99-96 (Nov. 30, 1999). 
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condemn the labor rights record of developing countries. But many 
environmental and labor rights groups view the world as a zero swn game: to the 
extent the wro succeeds at promoting globalization, then in equal measure do 
the environment and labor rights suffer. One can only pause and wonder 
whether they silently fear global economic interdependence and wish sub rosa for 
autarchy. In the words of former presidential economic adviser Murray 
Weidenbaum: 
If the full policy agenda of the anti-global activists were adopted, the long-run 
effect would be for the United States and other industrialized nations to lose the 
benefits of the specialization oflabor, and suffer severe declines in standards of 
living. Ironically, the economic costs would soon be translated into environmental 
costs. Wealthier countries can afford to devote more resources to achieving a 
cleaner environment, and they do so. Poorer countries do far less to clean up the 
environment.1OO 
Regardless of how wrong environmentalists and labor rights groups are about 
the wro, free trade, and globalization, it does not inexorably follow that a 
multilateral approach to all cross-border issues is necessarily the right approach. 
Multilateralism matters, but it is no desideratum. I have argued elsewhere, for 
example, that wro multilateral rules on competition policy would be a mistake. 
However, in the case of trade-environment issues, unilateralism simply is not a 
viable alternative to multilateralism. 
The wro is a fragile institution. If you visit the wro's web site, the wro 
will remind you of its fragility with an image of an egg. The wro's prestige, 
reputation, and authority are at an all-time low. The United States, its most 
powerful member, has been ambivalent at times in its support of the wro and 
its goal of promoting liberal trade. The commitment of the United States to U.S. 
participation in the wro is less than whole-hearted.161 But even the most vocal 
government critics of the wro have called for reform of the Organization, not 
160. Murray Weidenbaum, Globalization Myths, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 16, 1999, at 
9. 
161. Despite the U.s. Trade Representative's ringing endorsement of continued U.S. 
membership in the wro in her March 2000 Report, 2000 THE PRESIDENT'S TRADE POLK'Y 
AGENDA, a resolution wa~ introduced in Congress calling for U.S. withdrawal from the wro 
pursuant to section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (mandating a five-
year review of U.S. participation in the wrO). See Gary G. Yerkey, USTRSmdr Rrport 10 Con!,ms 
U'l,ing Continlledu'S. Participation in WTO, 17 Inri Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at 394 (Mar. 9,2000). 
That resolution was defeated in the House of Representatives on June 21, 2000 by a vote of363-56. 
Set Corbett B. Daly, HOlISe oj'&pmmtolives A./ftf1lls Ameri&OlI Membership ii, WorM Trade O'l,ani!(f1tion, 
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 25, at 975 Oune 22, 2000); Office of the USTR, USTR BorsheftJg 
Hoils Ovmvhelmint, HOllst Vote on Il?TO, BiportisOff Volt R§tdS U.S. WithdTtJ1VPI frolll WYO, Pres~ 
Relea~e 00-49 Oune 22, 2000). The House vote in June 2000 compares to a vote of 288-146 in 
November 1994 to join the Organization and approve the Uruguay Round agreements. 
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for u.s. withdrawal.162 At the same time intemperate and pandering remarks by 
President Clinton at the wro Seattle Ministerial Conference in late 1999, 
suggesting that the wro conclude an agreement on core labor standards that 
would be enforced through import bans, steeled the resolve of developing 
countries not to be steam rolled by the wro's developed-country members at 
any new wro trade negotiation round. 
All of these developments are unfortunate because the wro sets rules that 
bind rich countries and poor countries alike. Jeffrey Schott has noted that "as the 
weaker partners in the trading system, developing countries benefit the most 
when the major trading powers play by a common set of rules."l63 A liberal trade 
policy is a policy of increased competition and opportunity. Such a policy holds 
great promise for the world's developing countries. The big losers from the 
debacle in Seattle were developing countries. Forcing the bitter pill of unilateral 
regulation of the global commons and the environment down the throats of 
countries that are neither prepared nor willing to accept such rules is a 
prescription for failure. Developed countries can bully less-powerful developing 
countries into entering into such agreements, but adherence to the commitments 
made in them will be begrudging and cheating at the margins widespread. In 
order to be durable and robust, international environmental agreements must be 
perceived by the parties as being in their self-interest. 
Although trade and the environment are clearly linked, to press the wro into 
service as the forum for repairing the environment and saving the global 
commons would be misguided. 'fh:e institutional costs to the wro have been 
high. The wro's plate is full, its agenda unfinished, and its authority fragile. 
The wro dispute settlement mechanism is under tremendous stress. 16-1 Saddling 
the Organization with this hot-button issue---a virtual lightening rod planted on 
its institutional head-has done nothing but undermine the wro's status and 
drain valuable and scarce institutional resources away from its primary mission 
of promoting liberal trade by eliminating government barriers to trade. From a 
GAIT-WfO perspective, maintaining the status quo in the area of 
trade/environment, coupled with further research on the subject, is the only 
unambiguously beneficial course of action for the wro to pursue. 
162. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTRS tt to ISJlle Rrporl Defendillg COlltilllled U.s. ParticipOtiOIl ill WTO, 
17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), No.9, at 341 (Mar. 2, 2000)(Minority Leader Richard Gephardt 
continues to support u.s. participation in the organization, but dispute settlement b"}'stem needs to 
be reformed); Corbett B. Daly, W qrs olldMeolls POlltlRgects RtsolHtioll Collillgfor U.s. WilhdrmvolFrolll 
WTO, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 24, at 923 Oune 15,2000). 
163. Jeffrey Schott, After S tolllt, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000, at 66. 
164. Set Daniel Pruzin, WTO ChiefU'l,tS BlIdgtt Illmose, Highlights DispllleStttlelllent UJIiOJ1l, 17 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 38, at 1469 (Sept. 28,2000). 
